Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the Rise and Fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria
West Africa

Dr. Ahmed Adam Okene*
Visiting Associate Professor
Dr. Shukri B. Ahmad**
Associate Professor
Universiti Utara Malaysia College of Arts & Sciences
06010 Sintok, Kedah, Darul Aman
E-mail:, ahmedokene2001@yahoo.com,* ahmadokene@uum.edu.m,* shuk494@uum.edu.my**

Abstract
By 1817 a remarkable revolution which swept across Bilad Sudan (Western Sudan/West Africa) from 1804 resulted in the establishment of Sokoto Caliphate with Capital at Sokoto currently in Northern Nigeria. The Caliphate with over 31 emirates established justices, integrity, honesty and multicultural statecraft and mutual co-existence in the realms of political administration, economics, social imperatives and diplomatic affairs. However about four decades into its creation, the Caliphate began to decline in contents and substance ostensibly in line with the Ibn Khaldunian cyclical theory of the rise and fall of nation. By 1904, the British brought the Caliphate system to an end by its invasion and subsequent occupation. A multi disciplinary study of this nature locates a historical phenomenon within a universal theory in order to appreciate the generational nature of the pontification. Its continue relevance in the contemporary times in a different form rekindle the senses of self consciousness, togetherness, confidence and hope among the diverse peoples and groups influenced by the Caliphate based on common experience, history and shared destiny. It also adds to the existing literature on the subject matter just as it evokes discourse at global level.

Introduction
By the beginning of the 19th Century, the Bilad Sudan (West Africa) with its geo-political and territorial confines, including the rainforest in the south, the Sahara in the north, the Atlantic in the west and the Chad basin in the east, had undergone series of socio- political and econo-diplomatic transformations. Powerful empires, kingdoms and city- states like Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Oyo, Borno, Hausa states and Benin had risen, flourished and many had collapsed. In the same vein, lesser polities had also emerged by taking the advantages of environmental variables and social features, reached their apogees and collapsed. Empires and states were continuously been created. It was in these kind of environments that the Jihad led by Shaykh Uthman Bin Fudi (hereafter, Shaykh Dan Fodio), remained the greatest phenomenon to have shaped the socio-political, intellectual and diplomatic structures of the larger segment of the contemporary West Africa. The mainstream scholars on this subject agree that the zeal to spread the teachings of Islam, the cleansing of Muslims of West Africa from idol worshiping, superstitious and heresies and indeed, the transformation of the economic and political systems of the region were the original objectives of Shaykh Dan Fodio and his Jamaa (companions).

The corruption and contradictions which manifested themselves in the heathen practices at both individual and state level, the burdensome taxes, dynastic disputes among the ruling elites, the extortionist policy of the various governments and rampant maladministration at all levels of governments in Western Sudan before 1804 AD, gave opportunity of success to Shaykh Dan Fodio and his Jamaa. Indeed, the Shaykh and his companions represented the opposite of the violations of the rulers. So, when the Jihad began, a large number of people supported it for various reasons outside Islamic consideration. Shaykh Muhammad Bello, a leading figure of the Jihad alluded to this fact in his treatise Infaq al- Maysur that only one out of ten categories who fought beside Shaykh Dan Fodio actually did so for religious reasons.

Be that as it was, by 1917, the Sokoto Caliphate had been established firmly after the defeat of most Hausa states of West Africa particularly Alkalawa, Kebbi, Gobir, Kano and Zazzau. The Shaykh had retired to Sokoto into writing, teaching, researching, counseling and other academic and intellectual exercises. Shaykh Dan Fodio alone is credited with over one hundred (100) intellectual works in areas of jurisprudence, administration, law, literature, medicine and exegetes. He divided the territories of the Caliphate broadly into two spheres. Abdullahi Fudio, Shaykh’s brother took charge of southwest with Muhammad Bukhari, Shaykh Dan Fodio’s son assisting him. Gwandu was the headquarters of the southwest flank. Muhammad Bello, the Shaykh’s son took charge of the northeast with Aliyu Jedo assisting him. The capital of the northeast was Sokoto.
Hence forth, all administrative and military decisions were carried out in Sokoto and Gwandu respectively. At its apex in 1860, the Caliphate then as a continuous phenomenon had over 31 emirates under allegiance, with Kebbi, Kano, Zazzau (Zaria), Bauchi, Ilorin, Nupe and Muri been the prominent ones. The Caliphate covered an area of 250,000 sq miles and stretched as far as Nikki in the present day Benin Republic, Ngaundere and Tibati in the Republic of Cameroon and much of the southern part of Niger Republic. Its institutional influence also extended to Segou and Masina in the Republic of Mali, Fouta Djallon in the Republic of Guinea, Fouta Toro in the Sene-Gambia area, Northern Ghana, Chad in the Central Africa and further east into the Republic of Sudan. The ethical values, political organization, intellectual capacity and other legacies which Sokoto Caliphate represented and cherished extended far beyond its physical frontiers in West Africa. The Sokoto Caliphate was certainly the largest, most territorially extensive and literate state in African History.

In addition, the Caliphate was expansively heterogeneous, containing diverse peoples, different culture, languages and religions. As rightly observed by Claude Whitaker (2006:333), multi ethnicity and trans-nationalism were the hallmark of the composition of the Sokoto Caliphate. The Caliphate established justice in political administration, egalitarianism in its economic activities and equity, equilibrium and balances in its social sector. It created, like most Islamic caliphates of the past city states and towns, inspired trade and merchandise, established market that were regional and international and engaged in socio-spiritual rehabilitation. However within the five decades of its existence the Caliphate began to decay, reverting to some of the practices that necessitated the Jihad in the first place. In other words, the ideals expounded on by Shaykh Dan Fodio and his jamaa lasted for short times as successors to the throne both at the central and emirate levels derailed. Even in Hausa land where it had its firm root, the Jihad according to Mahdi (1985:118-120) and Augi (1984), had strengthened the Sarauta system it supplanted.

Indeed to Mahdi (1985:118), instead of the actualization of the hopes and aspirations of Shaykh Uthman Dan Fodio and his supporters to replace the sarauta system with an Islamic state, the sarauta system surreptitiously emerged even much stronger than ever before. Sarauta is a wide, rowdy, complex traditional mode of administration which combined Islamic values with pagan variables in a common frame work and system. Even as the Jihad moved into the phase of expansionism, it was accompanied with different motives with material appropriation being the upper most. In its western expansion, for instance into the Niger Confluence region, the Jihad was motivated less than religion but more by expansionist bid to conquer, pillage and extort. It is within this context that Ibn Khaldun and his famous cyclical postulation comes in. A nation lives within a span of time and collapse. At origin, the nation is bounded by some social values in a social cycle, known as asabiyya. It gravitates on this social platform to grow, capitalizing on the variables of productivity. At apex, the nation loses its veritables and noble ideals for reactionaries and subjectivities. The rulers losses grip and it collapse to be replaced by another who follow the same processes of rise and decay.

**Objectives**

From the above therefore, the objective of this study fundamentally is to examine the rise and decline of the Sokoto Caliphate using the Cyclical Theory of Ibn Khaldun as a parameter and yardstick; its applicability, extent and implication. As a recurrent academic phenomenon that continue to attract the attention of scholars and researchers from all over the world, this work hopes to contribute to the available literature on the subject matter. Though Ibn Khaldun’s Cyclical Theory has been variously applied to the study of some Muslim Empires especially of the Middle East origin; Umayyad, Abbasid, Safavid, Seljuk, and those of Central and Southeast Asia like, Mughal, Aurangzeb, Qutub Shahi, Aceh and Malaka (Hitti 1970; Itzkowitz 1972; Lipidus 1991; Ishak 2000; Lindholm 2002; Oloruntimihin 1972; Ahmad 2003) it has not been done (not to the knowledge of these scholars) to the Sokoto Caliphate of West Africa.

This work attempts to do so. More so, this work is inspired to contribute to knowledge using the universal theory and principle. Ibn Khaldun’s theory is certainly universal that can be applied to the study of the society of the past and indeed, of the contemporary. This study expounds on this realm and amalgam. It is hoped that scholars should find relevance in the philosophies of the yesteryears by modifying them to the usage of the modern. This is even so with theories propounded by Muslim scholars of the pristine, whose intellectual efforts are increasingly if not deliberately being obliterated and obscured by Western and Westernized epistemology and paradigms. This study is further justified by the desire to contribute to the growing literature on the history and the contemporary story of several Caliphates, Sultanates and Emirates that once flourished all over the world with the view of not only adding to their documentation but also to re evaluate their relevance to the modern political and economic societies. After all, our today is a reflection of our yesterday. Generally, this type of study therefore, is multi disciplinary, depending on the perspective of the school of thought, viewer and the reviewer.
It is a study in Political and Military History, Social anthropology, Governance and Political administration, General Islamics and International studies.

**Important Terminological Clarifications**

The subject of Sokoto Caliphate is a versed one, having several inexhaustible dimensions and attracting continuous battery of researches and attentions from all over the world, especially UK, USA and Africa. As the largest and longest empire that ever existed in Africa, the one that has the most enduring impact on the socio-political and economic lives of the diverse people of Africa and indeed, the continuous relevance of the old caliphate in the socio-political contestations in parts of West Africa in particular, it is therefore understandable. This study’s interest is limited to the application of the Cyclical Theory of Ibn Khaldun to the rise, growth and decline of the Caliphate. As such, only evidences and analyses necessary to arrive at this main objective have been marshaled and employed in this study. This work chose the names, Shaykh Uthman Dan Fodio instead of the other existing lexicological variations because these names should be rendered to give them the global application, understanding and popularity.

In the local parlance Shaykh is Shehu; Uthman is Usman and Dan Fodio is Ibn Fudi, respectively Arabic-Muslim and Ethnic Hausa-Fulani words. ‘Dan’ is the ethnic Hausa rendering of ‘Ibn’ in Arabic which means the ‘son of’ in English. In addition, this study is aware of the ethnocentric rendering of the Jihad as a “Fulani Jihad” especially among the British colonial historiographers, ethnographers and colonial administrators like Johnston, Arnett, Temple and Lugard. The Jihad and the Caliphate created by it, though led by an ethnic Fulani (Fulbe), were nevertheless multiracial and multinational in conception, organization, execution and administration. In the same vein, the research is aware of the varieties of discourse on, and criticism of, Ibn Khaldun’s theory. The focus of this research is the contextual analyses of the theory as it pertains to the rise but particularly the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate. Finally, this study is academic and scholarly with the intention of furthering the frontier of knowledge and discourse.

**Identifying Ibn Khaldun**

His names are Abu Zayd AbdulRahman B. Muhammad Ibn Khaldun Wali al-Din al-Tunis al-Hadrami. He was born in Tunis in the present day Tunisia in 1332AD, though his family originally migrated from Hadramawt, South Arabia through Serville. He studied the Qur’an (Muslims holy book), Hadith (Saying of the Prophet), Law, Tasawuf (Mysticism), Grammar, Rhetoric, Language and Philosophy. He belonged to the Maliki School of Thought, which was the bases and yardstick of his jurisprudence knowledge (Lindholm 2002:49; Ahmad 2003). The School of Thought was founded in the 8th Century by Imam Malik Ibn Anas. Ibn Khaldun also studied Quranic commentary (Tafsir), Grammar, History and Politics (Enan 2006:5-8). Earlier on as a young man, he took employment with Abu Inan’s court in Fez, in present Morocco, and eager to put his knowledge to practice, he began his intellectual discourse at the court. This obviously brought him into conflict with the rulers and some leading scholars of the time. Ibn Khadun went to prison for twenty months on account of this dialectical differences.

In 1362 he left for Granada, Spain where he became friendly with the rulers and scholars of the Islamic Spain of the time. Ibn Khaldun was particularly close with Muhammad II, Spain’s ruler between 1345 and 1391. He taught the King, philosophy, politics, mathematics and fundamentals of religion and law. As the Spain ambassador to Castille and Leon, Ibn Khaldun came to appreciate the precarious situation of the Muslim Spain, as it was surrounded by evil, unfriendly states and rulers. In other words, he saw the travails of Muslim Spain in later years. From Granada, Ibn Khaldun returned to North Africa where he soon became the Chief Adviser to the throne. The appointment gave him enormous power, influence and authority. The appointment particularly made him to comprehend the temptation inherent in high positions of authority.

When his benefactor in North Africa died, Ibn Khaldun went into full time research, teaching and writing at Baskara and Fez. Sooner, he went back to Spain, where unfortunately he met that his former employer and student, Muhammad II had grown autocratic ordering the killing of his political opponent and social critics (Ahmad 2003). Infact, it was in his attempt to save a co- scholar, Ibn Al – Khatib that he earned the wrath of Muhammad II, who ordered Ibn Khaldun’s arrest and banishment. He ran into safety and got himself isolated in the castle of Ibn Salama. There, he pondered over the riddles and vagaries of the world and began his active pontifications. Though he still took employment as Grand Qadi of the Malikite School of law in Cairo, Ibn Khaldun had by this time became a renowned philosopher, teacher, counselor, author and political theorist. His lost of his family and his personal belongings in a ship wreck at Alexandria returned him to an unparallel level of spirituality and philosophy, Ibn Khaldun became world acclaim and celebrated even before his death in 1406 AD (Lindholm 2002:49) Ibn Kaldun marveled at the world; it ups and downs, temptation, trials, alluring, success and failures: the vagaries of the Abbasid and Umayyad kingdoms.
He repulsed how kings rose, reached their grandeur and apogee, and then declined and fell. Ibn Khaldun scorned at the moral corruption and antiquated social disconnection in Cairo and other Muslim world. He also did not fathom the Bedouin life which was knitted in savagery and insubordination. Whatever the case, Ibn Khaldun’s life is full of lessons. It taught us, as succinctly put by Akbar Ahmad, the uncertainty of politics; the fecklessness of rulers; the abrupt changes of fortune, in jail one day, honoured the next and finally, the supremacy of the ideal in the constant, unceasing search for *ilm*, knowledge, and therefore the ultimate triumph of the human will and intellect against all odds (Ahmad 2003:146).

**Pontifications and Methodology**

Ibn Khaldun’s contribution to knowledge, philosophy and law are immensely enormous. Today, despite the efforts to obscure and obliterate his pioneering roles in some modern fields of social science, most scholars of western and eastern derivations readily agree that Ibn Khaldun played pioneering roles in the scientific rendering of sociology, history, political science, human geography, philosophy of education, communication language and anthropology. His essays were detailed and his theories were reformatory and radical. More so, his approaches to study and writing were logical, philosophical and moralistic. He applied himself to his faith in his several expositions. Ibn Khaldun’s earliest and one of the most prominent contributions to knowledge which is still celebrated today was his *Muqaddimah*, the Introduction. The *Muqaddimah* (*Ibn Khaldun 1981*) is certainly a science of history, sociology and anthropology. The work is itself, philosophical in all ramifications. In this work, he deferred from earlier scholars like Al Masudi and Al Bakri of the 10th Century who relied excessively in their works on genealogical rendering of the past through King Lists. Ibn Khaldun adopted a systematic approach to the study of society which he called *Ilm Al Imran*, the “science of culture and society”. The work has several aspects to its expositions. However, the concern of this research work is the area that espouses on the span of governance.

To Ibn Khaldun political administration lasts for four generations before it is overthrown or supplanted and replaced by a new one, which replenish and then, follow the same process to apogee and then, collapse. At rise and growth, rulership is held together and united by what he called *asabiyah*, technically ‘group feelings’, ‘cohesion’, ‘solidarity’. Due to solidarity and cultural togetherness, the group takes control of governance; administer justice and as time went by, the controlling group living a luxury and opulence of urbanization and sedentarization are also overthrown by fresher tribesmen, who soon became urbanized and are also overthrown by fresher tribesmen (*Ibn Khaldun 1981:313*). To Ibn Khaldun, the cyclical pattern marks the Islamic political history. In essence, social group came together to organize themselves and take over governance through violence. In power, the rulership group institute good leadership, organized egalitarian economic system, fortified themselves by social reorientation, variables and functional political activities. Soon afterwards, the social cohesion began to drift, dwindle and visibly decay as individualism, greed, avarice, corruption and sleazebag cropped in the system of government.

This is so because, the rulers due to foundational derailment, after several generations began to seek, according to Ibn Khaldun “the help of clients and followers against men of his people” in order to sustain themselves in governance. The gradual disenfranchisement of his kinsmen occurs because the ruler fears that they, as co-equals and tribal brothers, can and will make claims on his sovereignty. In response, he slowly replaces them with slaves, clients and hired employees who are directly reliant on him for their positions. The ruler’s aim is to increase his authority by exchanging his potential rivals for a convoy of dependants. Despite its advantages to the rulers, Ibn Khaldun, argues that the eventual effect of the systematic downgrading of one’s kin and close tribal allies in favour of dependant clients is negative. The ruler does gain more leeway, in Charles Lindholm’s words, for exercising his own autocratic authority dispensing with those who had helped his ancestors’ to victory (*Lindholm: 51*). But according to Ibn Khaldun, without these kinsmen and allies to his own to support him, he is instead surrounded with flatterers and sycophants, and can be easily ousted by more aggressive and unified tribal opponents invading his realm from the periphery.

This is understandable because clients, hangers-on and slaves lack the essential ingredient that promotes social solidarity and self sacrifice; this ingredient is to Ibn Khaldun, the *asabiyah*, group feelings. Leadership becomes authoritarian and viciously tyrannical. They employ coercion and threat to extract the people’s loyalty. The consequences of this are many. Qualities of administration begin to erode until the regime meets its waterloo and subsequently eased out by another group of rulership. These processes of rise, growth and fall to Ibn Khaldun continue in a cyclical manner. Before, during and after Ibn Khaldun’s theory, empires, kingdom, caliphates, sultanes, etc, have risen and fallen following the pattern enunciated by Ibn Khaldun. This was the story of Abbasid and Umayyad caliphates, Seljuk, Saffavid and Mughal kingdoms in one way or the other. Scholars who criticized Ibn Khaldun can be classified in to three groups. The first are made up of those who think Ibn Khaldun was too simplistic in looking at the history of Muslim states within small span of just four generations.
Many polities like Ottoman, Saffavid and Mughal according to this school survived beyond four generations specified by Ibn Khaldun. Indeed, the Ottoman lived between 13th and 20th Centuries. The defence here is that Ibn Khaldun’s mentioning of four generations is allegorical and not categorical. In this vein therefore, the import of Ibn Khaldun’s theory to this study is that whatever the extent of growth and span of an empire or a political authority, it shall decline and collapse. The second category charged that Ibn Khaldun did not apply enough moral and adequate faith-based gauges in his theory. To this group, what should be upper most in the rise and fall of any Islamic polity is that the “frasher” coming from the periphery are motivated by the zeal to return Islam and Society to the Caliphate style as witnessed during the era of the rightly guided Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet(SAW). However it should not be lost here that whatever the reason for a fresh overthrow, the fact of social feelings as expounded by Ibn Khaldun cannot be discountenanced. It also meant that whatever the social order that motivated the takeover depend entirely on the inspiring ideology, philosophy and social form.

Except in few cases, most “frasher” are motivated by group interest and solidarity feeling to seek power and wealth (Lapidus 1991:207; Lindholm 2002:59). The third group contains those who felt that the cyclical theory is no longer applicable to the modern highly developed and organized world. To this category of Thinkers, there are no longer Bedouins with uncivilized characteristics uncouthness and insubordination. Even if they exist, they no longer have access to the cities which are now developed, fortified and transformed by technology. In addition, complex nation states, civic responsibilities and nationhood system have been evolved which render constant rise, fall and collapse mechanisms in nullity. Nations are now defined by inviolable borders and national institutions, organs and imperatives.

In essence, to this group, Ibn Khaldun never foresaw that development in government, security, military and structuralized economy will erode tribal feelings and thereby eliminate cyclical theory (Ahmad2003:71). In as much as all these are obvious developments that have questioned the veracity of Ibn Khaldun theory, they do not in themselves repudiate the complete correctness of the theory. A modern re interpretation of the cyclical theory would construe the phrase “rise” and “fall” from dynamic perspectives. Rise may not necessarily continuously mean the physical creation or evolvement and growth of a particular state. In the contemporary sense, rise should mean, playing the centre-stage role; dominating the global scenes, and directing international thinking and actions. In the same vein, decline, fall or collapse mean inability to play a frontline role in the global equation of power. If these re interpretations are latent, it means therefore that the Ibn Khaldun theory is still valid. Indeed, this is the position of this work.

The Establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate

In 1804, Shaykh Uthman Dan Fodio and his jamaa lunched an Islamic Jihad in the Western Sudan also called Bilad Sudan but now roughly Western Africa. Long before the commencement of the Jihad Shaykh Dan Fodio had been involved in academic and intellectual works. He was of Fulbe stock and some sources traced his genealogy to that of Prophet Muhammad, SAW (Bukhari: nd). He was versed in Quranic exegetes (Tafsir), Linguistics, Hadith, Fiqh and Arabic grammar. Shaykh Dan Fodio was also an expert on dialectics, philosophy, urban geography, social anthropology and general medicine. First and foremost he was an Islamic scholar who was deeply concerned with the affairs of Islam and Muslim in West Africa during the period. Though Islam had entered West Africa through North Africa in the 6th Century, between this period and the opening of the 19th Century, its practice had been syncretism. There is no doubt that the rulers of the ancient Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Takrur, Borno empires and indeed, the Hausa states had been Muslims some times, or at worse non- Muslims but who employed the services of Muslims’ arts of writing in courts, palaces, diplomacy, their conduct of affairs were far from being based on justice, equity and egalitarianism, which to Shaykh Dan Fodio should have been the practice.

In addition, the political administration in the West Africa was oppressive with over burden taxation on the common artisans, farmers and herdsmen. There were contradictions in the entire region and high level of dynastic disputes in which the Hausa state rulers in particular like those of Kano, Zamfara, Kebbi, and those of Jukun and Borno were in constant border skirmishes. It was in this environment and situation Shaykh Dan Fodio began his preaching and teaching. The Shaykh’s teachers were scattered all over Africa among who were Jibril Bn Umar and Muhammad Al Agadasi. His immediate followers were his brother, Abdullahi and children, Muhammad Bello, Aliyu Jeda, Muhammad Bukhari and Nana Asmau. By 1804, they had become versatile scholars in several Islamic and material knowledge, and indeed, in the affairs of the West Africa. The Shaykh preached pure Islam and exhort the rulers of the area against extortion and oppression. Since each social and economic group had its grudges against the conduct of affairs in the West Africa, the callings of the Shaykh appealed to all for different reasons. They flocked around him and his Jamaa swelled to become threat to the ruling elites of the area in the period.
Particularly the rulers of Hausa states who were known for their oppression and extortionist policies in order to maintain their hegemony were apprehensive. Thus, in early 1804, the Sarkin (Ethnic Hausa word for King) Gobir, Yunfa ordered that the Shaykh be eliminated. This made the Shaykh and his Jamaa to embark on Hijra (exodus, flight) from their Degel base to Gudu. The Hijra meant several things to the Shaykh and his Jamaa, among which was the fact that they had become a distinct group in the political contestation for the control of the ecological zone. In addition, the Shaykh could then address his Jamaa on the changing phase of struggle; he did and his Jamaa began to arm themselves against the onslaught and dysfunctional ubiquity of the rulers of the West Africa (Gwandu 2006:22-24). Earlier on in 1803, he had authoured a treatise, *Masail Muhimma*, Important Questions where he addressed various issues relevant to the social and economic conditions of the Sudan. Sooner, the Kingdoms and City states of Alkalawa, Zamfara and Kebbi attacked the Shaykh and his Jamaa at their Gudu base. The result was the launching of Jihad. By 1815 all Hausa states had been conquered and new emirates with new Emirs (Amir) installed as the rulers. Apart from the initial conquest at Alkalawa, Kebbi, Gobir, most other conquests were done either by direct students of Shaykh who studied under him or those who came to collect flags of allegiance. The Shaykh had neither a standing army nor an organized structurally based military. Every able bodied was a contingent. The Adamawa/Gombe emirate was established in 1809 through Moddibo Buba Yero, a student of Shaykh; Zazzau(Zaria) emirate in 1804 through Mallam Musa; Muri emirate by Hammarwa in 1809; Yola emirate through Moddibo Adama; Nupe through Dendo, among many others.

**The Political Economy of Sokoto Caliphate**

With the Caliphate well established by 1817, the leadership of the Jihad went ahead to dispense justice. As in line with the Ibn Khaldun conception of *Umran Hadari* (civilization/Sedentary life) which is characterized by urbanization, conquered places were turned into administrative centres as urbanization began to grow. Sokoto itself was an entirely Caliphate creation as a befitting administrative capital with all the necessary facilities. Islam was the bases of creation and governance of the Caliphate. But it was strengthen by social nexus of relatives, studentship and large numbers of ethnic Fulani who flocked around the Shaykh. Islam was the first beneficiary of the Caliphate. Though complex with diverse cultures, religions and ethnicity, Islam became the basis of governance and through it, justices, equity, egalitarianism and fairplay were dispatched and dispensed. Shariah was extolled as the means to inter-personal, governmental relationship. In addition, government officials maintained law and order just as they operated within the confines of law in order to stay in power, earned recognition and promotion (Mahdi Adamu 2006; Shea2006).

The judicial system hitherto bastardized under the despotic rulers of the West Africa was reformed. Judges were learned and in order to maintain checks and balances, judgments at emirate level were appealed at the Caliphal headquarters; judgments in some cases were nullified by the Caliph at Sokoto. No one was allowed to operate above the law as the rules of law were upheld. Education, considered as the bedrock of development and society was strengthened throughout the Caliphathe, at the centre and emirate levels. Morality was blend with education and general knowledge. Schools of various levels, learning centres and craft training points were established. Education was not narrowed down. It was broad. Knowledge of jurisprudence, poetry, medicines, business and trades among many were pursed, encouraged and revolutionized (Mahdi Adamu 2006). In Adamawa, Nupe, Ilorin and Bauchi emirates, women education were boosted. Pre- Sokotan era was anti women education. In the Caliphal era, women owned schools and some like Nana Asmau were noted for their intellectual erudite and prowess. They took over teaching whenever their men went out on expeditions (Boyd 2006; Tukur2006).

The Caliphate boosted economy. Businesses, trades and commerce were encouraged, just as they became expanded throughout the Caliphate. Internal and external economies of scale were capitalized upon as trades were of short and long distances. With an expansive geographical environment which covered substantial parts of modern Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, there was greater security on the high ways and hinterland which helped to promote trade, general exchange, goods movement and merchandise. Artisanship and mercantilism were inspired as practitioners took advantages of the justice environment to flourish and profit. Emirates like Kano, Nupe, Yola, Ilorin and Zamfara known for enterprising in the pre- Caliphate era became more buoyant with the establishment of the Caliphate. Kano’s internationalization of business and trade dated several centuries before the Jihad. However, the creation of the Caliphate in which Kano was a prominent emirate gave it industrial pre- eminence. Infact, the defeat of Bornoans and the sack of Birnin Gazzargamu in 1809 and the eventual evacuation of the government from the imperial city knocked off Borno’s stiff competition with Kano. The political survival of Kano as an emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate and as its new economic growth was secured as merchants based in Kano became the full controllers, according to Mahdi Adamu (2006:90) of lucrative trade with the Borno and with the territories located to the city’s south and southwest towards modern central Nigeria and Niger Benue confluence area.
The Sokoto Caliphate also boosted positive social mobility, large scale migration and high level urbanization, some of which began in the earlier period. Kano, Yola, Bauchi, Gombe, Ilorin and Bida witnessed urbanization as people migrated there due to security to lives and properties after the Jihad. Jihad outposts were transformed into big towns. Kano emirate alone boasted of several of such transformed outpost, like, Gwarzo, Karaye, Babura and Rano (Last 1967; Dantiye 1987). It was also a period when large numbers of people of Borno, Shuwa Arab, Kanuri, Baburawa migrated from the frontier areas into big cities of business, social stability and commerce of Katagun, Gumel, Hadeija and Kazaure emirates. Though most leaders of the Jihad were Fulani ethnic race, the Jihad strengthens Hausa language, culture, arts and traditional system all over the expanse of the Caliphate. Indeed, at the eve of the British invasion of the region from the late 19th Century, Hausa language and culture were already established as common legacies, even beyond the Caliphate in the entire West and into Sudan and Egypt in the North Africa. Sokoto Caliphate also maintained a robust diplomatic relationship with the outside world. However diplomatic relations guided by the principles and philosophy of Islam dictated the categorization of the countries to relate with.

Muslim Kingdoms like Saadia of Morocco and Ottoman Caliphate had fruitful reciprocal relationship with the Sokoto Caliphate while recalcitrant Borno Sultanate and the British (in the last segment of the 19th century) drew negative diplomacy from the Caliphate (Alkali 2006; Sani 2006). Philip Shea (1975), R.A. Adeleye(1971), Mahdi Adamu(1978,2006), Abdulkadir Adamu (2006), Murray Last(1967) and Ibrahim Jumare (2006) agree that the establishment of the Caliphate led to high level of economic development, security to free flow of goods and services and urbanization all of which support the assertion of Ibn Khaldun theory of umran hadari with its characteristics tamaddun nature. Omar Spahic (2005) emphasizes this by listing some of the features of this period. The society has; a high standard of security; high standard of physical health; adequate infrastructure; promotion and maintenance of the required agricultural and industrial activities; peaceful co-existence with the natural environment and the maintenance of political control. Other features include, provision of adequate amenities; cleanliness; sustainibility and the creation of communities with high degree of social integration. In addition, Spahic averred that because of the progress, professional, business groups and scholars would be attracted to the polity (Spahic 2005; Alatas 2008). At its apex in the 1850, as analyzed above, the Sokoto Caliphate and its emirates had all these traits and characteristics.

The Decline and Collapse of the Sokoto Caliphate

However, all these prosperous and highly organized socio-political, economic and diplomatic arrays were within the first few generations of the establishment of the Caliphate. At least the last four decades before the final collapse of the Caliphate to the imperial British witnessed weakness, decadence and decline in the contents, context, structures and super structures of the Caliphate. Hiskett (1973), Abdullahi Mahdi (1985), Augi (1984), Chinedu Ubah (1985; 2006) and P.K. Tibenderana (1988), though not disputing its achievements, contend that the Caliphate either came to strengthen the sarauta system from the onset and did not match its fundamental ideals with realities when it was established or reverted to the pre-jihad era soon after it was established. To these scholars, the Caliphate’s institution of the monarchical system of succession and the replication of the pre-Jihad existing Hausa titles, customs and socio-mores, justifies their position.

Abdullahi Mahdi put this assertion clearly when he writes that, the Jihad movements in Kano and elsewhere in Hausaland was a typical example of a revolution without transformation of the pre-existing structures of the social system. What the Jamaa succeeded in doing, continued Mahdi, was the removal of the rulers from power and leaving intact the very well established state structures and institutions which the new rulers simply accommodated and enlarged (Mahdi 1985:124-125). This study does not subscribe to this assertion that from its outset, the Caliphate came to overthrow the leaders of the West Africa states while replacing them with its men. It however discovers that as time went by, the Caliphate derailed from its foundational philosophy and callings. If we take this assertion as a logical interpretation of the Jihad, it means therefore that the Ibn Khaldun thesis that the goal of the nomadic civilization naturally evolved towards sedentary civilization not in the sense that the one gives way to the other but rather in the sense that “sedentary culture is the goal of Bedouin life” and that “the goal of civilization is sedentary culture and luxury” is correct (Ibn Khaldun, 1981: 371).

Ibn Khaldun agrees that in moving towards these major objectives, religion could be a rallying point and pivotal for change. In the first analysis, borrowing from Ibn Khaldun himself, “the nature of the existence of the tribesmen made them dependent on the cities for the basic necessities of life”. In addition as poignantly captures by Alatas (2008:69), the tribes were dependent on a religious leader or saint (Wali) who interpreted religion for them. The Wali himself was motivated by the impiety that had developed in the urban areas as a result of the luxurious life and the political excesses committed by the town’s people. Interpretatively, the Wali which in this case was Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio was the compact core of the social change which as discussed above was disdained by the political and economic corruption of the rulers of the Western Africa.
States of the Western Africa especially in the Hausa States where the Jihad commenced were highly developed in line with Ibn Khaldun’s pontification with hierarchical statecrafts, organized industries and merchandise (Mahdi Adamu, 2006; Abdulkadir Adamu, 2006) who nevertheless committed political and financial excesses. In the same vein, religion, which in this case was Islam served as the cord for the social group (asabiyaa) who rally round the Wali. The Shaykh’s Jamaa were actually a social force which Islam knitted together in a common community with a common objective, goal and cause. However, as much as the charge of the imposition of family rule system may have contradicted the theoretical and idealistic position of the leaders of the Caliphate, it is understandable that the Shaykh was succeeded by his son, Muhammad Bello and his brother, Abdullahi. The two were actually the most knowledgeable among the lieutenants of the Shaykh with Abdullahi deriving some of his sources of erudite, training and knowledge from those of Shaykh Dan Fodio, while both Shaykh Dan Fodio and Abdullahi were prominent teachers of Muhammad Bello. More so, the two were the closest allies, confidants and companions to the Shaykh Dan Fodio.

As such, they understood better than any members of the Jamaa, the terrain of knowledge, geography, environment and circumstances that informed the Jihad just as they participated in all expeditions which led to the establishment of the Caliphate. By these therefore, the two were the most qualified irrespective of blood relationship, to lead the Caliphate at the time they were selected. Nevertheless, before the British began a piecemeal conquest and occupation of the part of the Caliphate which culminated in 1904, exactly a century after it was established, the Caliphate in line with the cyclical theory of Ibn Khaldun could be said to be in the state of weakness and decline. Declining features and collapsing variables included but not limited to, the entrenched of hereditary system of succession, institution of regimes of injustice especially at the emirate level, reversion to some primordial and decadence pre-Jihad customs and traditional of the Hausa societies, the faulty materialistic strategies and motives used in the extension of the Jihad southwest and the intractable weakened the Caliphate. They were also part of the reasons advanced by the British to justify their conquest of the Caliphate.

We have argued above that although Muhammad Bello and Abdullahi had blood ties with the Shaykh, they were the most qualified and suited to succeed to the throne of the Caliphate at the time. However, the perpetuation of hereditary rulership both at the centre and the emirate level ran contrary to the ethics of Islam and the Caliphate system as theorized by the founding leaders and scholars of the Caliphate. Shaykh Danfodio, Abdullahi and Muhammad Bello had written in several of their intellectual works that hereditary was evil and leadership should be by selection or election. For instance in his Bayan Wijab al Hijra, Shaykh Dan Fodio pointed out that, “one of the swiftest ways of destroying a Kingdom is to give preference of one particular tribe over another, or show favour to one group of people rather than the other…” The consequences of the hereditary system of succession were many. But the most profoundly depilating of them was that it led to the establishment of dynasties at the centre and at the emirate level. As time went by there arose nepotism, mediocrity, dynastic squabbles and rivalries among family members. The cases of Nupe, Kano, Bauchi, Yola, Adamawa and Muri have been documented (Hamman 2006; Danmole 2006; Saeed 2006).

Outside the above, Saad Abubakar recorded the various internal conflicts that faced the caliphate generally in the course of the 19th century, with the severe ones manifesting themselves in the Buhari rebellion of 1850-63 in Hadejia, the Talata-Anka revolt in 1891, the Basasa (civil war) of 1894-6 in Kano, and the Mahdism during the last decades of the Century (Abubakar1999:308-309). In the same vein, there were the component emirates of the Caliphate that faced grave internal problems, such as the rebellions by conquered groups, vassal chiefs or by subordinate officials which particularly characterized the history of Zaria and Fombina. Dynastic crises weakened the caliphate and exposed its frontiers and its internal dynamism to, attacks and contradictions respectively. In addition, justices in the administration were compromised. Hiskett (1973:106), Mahdi (1985:122-125) and Ubah (1985:23-26) recorded cases of miscarriage of justice. Some of the Qadis as in cases of Sifawa and Kano were employed without requisite qualifications just as some of them took bribes and financial inducement to pervert justice. As such, the quality of justice decline after the early years of the Caliphate. Ubah’s study of Kano, for instance indicated that the Judges had no permanent official place for dispensing of justice; they had no hours of working and there were recorded cases of partiality in cases involving the rich, the poor and the strong (Ubah 1985:25). There were in fight between the princes over power and as poignantly put by Abdullahi Mahdi, the scramble for state offices which involved bribery and corruption on the parts of the ruling class was not motivated by selfless service to the society but by the fact that all successful candidates derived a lot of illegal wealth from the office which they virtually purchased (Mahdi 1985:125). The poor quality of justice matched with the poor leaders that emerged in some of the emirates.
Launching of Jihad, the Nupe and Ilorin gave preference to economic and political factors. Contrary to the ideals of the Caliphate which emphasized scholarship and morality as prerequisites to propagation as propounded by the leaders of the Jihad were to be abided by, adhered to, and indeed strictly from gaining access to the Islamic homeland. But in the extension activities, principles of expansion and the frontiers. Apart from this rationale, constant extension was a sure way of keeping the hostile neighbours for the slave trade, down to the coast where ships took the slaves to foreign ports.

In line with the cyclical theory that the farther the rulership and governance from its root, original principles and establishment period, the closer it is to its demise, the Sokoto Caliphate in its later period became victim. In its expansion generally but particularly towards the West and South, the Caliphate exhibited signs of weakness and decline. A condition of the Jihad as enunciated by its leaders was expansionism. This was in line with the principle of Islam as adopted by the leaders of the Jihad which enjoins propagation and extension of the frontiers. Apart from this rationale, constant extension was a sure way of keeping the hostile neighbours from gaining access to the Islamic homeland. But in the extension activities, principles of expansion and propagation as propounded by the leaders of the Jihad were to be abided by, adhered to, and indeed strictly followed. Towards the southwest, the Caliphate agents of expansion were the Nupe and Ilorin emirates. But contrary to the ideals of the Caliphate which emphasized scholarship and morality as prerequisites to launching of Jihad, the Nupe and Ilorin gave preference to economic and political factors.

Abdulkadir (1990:248-252), Danmole (1980), Ige (1986) and Okene (2006), among others have variously showed in their researches how economic considerations were the major factor in the launching of the Jihad in the areas they studied. What is however important here is to show how this approach weakened the Caliphate and paved way for its final demise. The Nupe’s leading the extension of the Caliphate could be used as an illustration. Though Islam had been in Nupe land long before the Jihad was launched there and at a certain time, according to a leading scholar of the Jihad phenomenon, Bala Yusuf Usman (2006:156), there was even an attempt to launch a Jihad before the Jihad of Shehu Dan Fodio. However, the complex situation that led to the establishment of the Nupe emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate began with the invitation to a certain Dendo in 1818 by the rival successors to the throne of Etsu (King) of the land. Dendo, an Islamic scholar of ethnic Fulani extraction was a disciple of Shaykh Dan Fodio who had involved in the Jihad plan and execution at its outbreak in 1804 in Hausa land. With the death of the Etsu Muazu, the King of Nupe land, his son, Jimada and his nephew, Majiya became contenders to the throne.

Dendo and his followers accepted the invitation of Majiya and helped to enthrone him defeating his arch rival, Jimada. Soon, rivalries erupted between Jimada and his helper, Dendo when the later created an alternate power in his place. The rivalries were carried to their children and successors. Whatever the case, the series of wars, intrigues and strife were resolved in favour of Jamaa of the Caliphate, as Masaba(1859-1873) and Umar Majigi (1873-1889) descendants of Dendo, consolidated their reigns and became responsible in the western expansion of the Caliphate to the areas of the Niger- Benue Confluence region and beyond into the southwest. Between 1850 and 1897 when Bida the capital of Nupe emirate was sacked by the British, the emirate’s Jihad activities in the southwest were characterized by raids, capture of slaves, destruction and general material exploration and exploitation; styles which run contrary to the literary and intellectual position of the founders of the Caliphate. In other words, in its early period, the Jihad was preceded by teaching, preaching, invitation to, and conversion into, the fold of Islam.

Shaykh Dan Fodio, Abdullahi, Muhammad Bello and other leaders wrote books on various aspects of Islam; they took decades preaching, teaching and inviting the people to oneness of Allah, rituals of Islam and the justice inherent in the universality of Islam. Contrarily, those who carried the Jihad westward were interested more on the economic gains and the power it conferred. Thus, the movement of the Jihad west and south represented a new phase and interest. As expected, the Jihad in that interest neither produced scholars nor converted substantial number of people. People, contrary to what was experienced in 1804, were recruited into fostering a cause they never believed on and therefore never fought with zeal, conviction and enthusiasm. This was a weakness on the part of the Jihad itself. According to Nadel (1942:85-86), prosecuting the Jihad southward and westward offered densely populated areas for slave- raiding, the command of the main route for the slave trade, down to the coast where ships took the slaves to foreign ports.
For instance, Masaba conquered Kakanda in 1854 and instead of a religious teacher, quickly appointed a market agent to oversee the Nupe canoes carrying slaves and various goods safe passage between Nupe country, Lokoja and Onitsha trading ports. The highly developed trades, commerce and crafts of the south attracted the Nupe country which had grown rich and fastidious. The Ebira, Okun and Igala have all been invaded in order to subjugate them so as to pave way for full control of the Niger region and the various trade routes to the south. Nupe emirate authorities needed an uninterrupted access to the coast in the south where they could trade directly with the established European firms and acquired firearms. The Ebira were known in the Niger – Benue Confluence area for their dominance in crafts, thread, cotton and cloth weaving and indeed, other sylvan products. The various attacks on the area between 1865 and 1880 by the Nupe Jihadists were motivated mainly by economic factors (Okene 2006:75). In the same vein, Abdulkadir (2006:57) has documented evidence to show that the prosecution of the Jihad by the Nupe emirate into Igala land was fundamentally motivated by material reasons. According to him, the Nupe Jihadists were interested in the economic viability of Igala’s “middle men” position in the north-south trading system, the acquisition of slaves and firearms and the control over ivory trade and markets between Adamagu and Kotonkarfe. Infact, it was for these reasons that the Nupe Jihadists overran these towns and other settlement towards north of Igala land between 1833 and 1853. In the same vein, the successive reigns from 1857 of Usman Zaki, Masaba, Umar Majigi, Maliki and Abubakar as Emirs of Nupe emirate witnessed what Ige called “the organized exploitation of Okun land using various means including wars, intimidation, coercion and diplomacy” (Ige 2006:274). The success of these approaches led to the Jihadists having access to “a reservoir of slaves and craftsmen” (Ige 2006:275), enhancement of the long distance trade between Nupe emirate with Afanmai and Benin in the south just as the emirate became the sole collected of taxes and tributes from the conquered people.

What all these meant was that in the extension of the Caliphate westward and southward West Africa, mundane factors were the main goals. As rulers especially of the frontline states, Nupe and Ilorin pursued material gains with insignificant attention given to the original philosophy of the Caliphate. Due to this alteration, political cohesion was lost, moral justification for the establishment of governance was withered down and there was the resultant series of dynastic cleavages as contenders wanted to take control of wealth and power. These manifested themselves in almost all the emirates from 1860 onwards but particularly in Nupe, Ilorin, Kano, Gombe, Yola/Adamawa and Muri emirates. These created weakness in the sustenance and continuity of the Caliphate. In Muri emirate for instance, Mahmoud Hamman noted that the sudden death of Hammawarwa and the heir apparent, Bose in 1833, created a problem of succession which strained the relations between Hammawarwa’s sons (Hamman 2006:149). This development sowed the seed of discord in the emirate and it progressively took serious dimensions as the various factions established semi-autonomous territorial bases from where they sought to either capture political power at the centre or challenge the legitimacy of the emirate government if they failed to do so.

Due to the infighting for power and wealth, to Hamman (2006:149), Muri emirate was by the end of 18th Century bedeviled by centrifugal tendencies and dynastic conflicts which prevented it from developing as a coherent political entity. Though this account was made on Muri emirate, the situation more or else applied to the entire emirate towards the end of the 18th Century when the British began its systemic conquest. Claude Whitaker, a renowned scholar of the Caliphate succinctly supports this position when he wrote that, “unfortunately, a non-linear flow of Caliphal authority was not sustained once power had been consolidated by successive generations of emirate rulers who had inherited their thrones” (Whitaker 2006:334). Whitaker (2006:334) agrees that, by the time the British arrived approximately a century after the Caliphate was established, there was clear evidence that the Sultans of the Emirates were again behaving like sovereigns and that corruption and malpractice were rampant. In essence therefore, lack of cohesion among the ruling elites, abandonment of the original ideals, corruption and rapacity of the dynastic rulership and wanton injustices, as propounded by Ibn Khaldun provided the factors of collapse of the Sokoto Caliphate in the same way it provided the justification for the overthrow of the Caliphate. This is because as analyzed above, by the end of the 19th Century, the Caliphate was ripe for reformation and transformation. But contrary to the position of the theory, reformation did not come from within those who wanted to return the Caliphate to its 1804 pristine position, but from outsiders who supplanted it with an entirely different system of governance.

Though Whitaker (2006) and Last (1967) feel different, the British who invaded and occupy Sokoto Caliphate effectively from 1904 felt that colonialism which they foisted on the people was messianic, undertaken to cleanse the Caliphate of misrule. To the British imperialists, the Muslims under Shehu Danfodio took over the Western Sudan from 1804 by conquest and imposed their rule over the various kingdoms and states, the Caliphate by way of conquest because the Caliphate was corrupt. F. D. Lugard who led the sack of the Caliphate expressed this view on the final fall of Sokoto, the Caliphate’s capital in 1904. He stated that, the Fulani of the old times under Danfodio conquered this country.
They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose the Kings and to create Kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hands of the British. All those things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British. Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of the state will be appointed by the Higher Commissioner throughout all the country (Kirk-Green1965:43). Though the study of the method, processes and execution styles adopted by the British to sack the Caliphate are beyond the scope of this study, it is important to mention that the British used a piece meal strategy and other complex tactics which conquered one emirate after the other. The invasion began with the Nupe and Ilorin emirates in 1895 and by 1904, Sokoto, the capital of the Caliphate had been in corporate into the British colonial empire. Also, by this conquest, the Caliphate had obviously lost its sovereignty, political authority and independence and auras to the British.

The Sultan, a phrase imposed by the British to replace Caliph and all the emirs (created to replace Amir) were appointed by the British and therefore had to relate with the new authority directly in line with the oath of allegiance each took. Though the British colonial system evolved a dual mandate and indirect rule system which helped to entrenched the hegemony of the Sultans and Emirs over their citizens, the real power and authority resided with the British High Commissioners and his white agents who were appointed Resident officers, Divisional officers, and District officers to monitor the British conception of administration. Though Ibn Khaldun cyclical theory has been severely criticized by some scholars on its viability in explaining the rise and demise of political authority, it remains valid to a remarkable extent in explaining some critical political events even in the past and contemporary. For instance, the world itself was a Muslim world between the 16th and 19th Centuries. Muslim powers of the Ottoman, Safavid, Mughals and other very many Sultanates and Emirates dominated the global scene. By the 19th Century, the world was the British image and creation. It led the world to industrialization, medicine and aviation. The British also conquered the world and imposed her hegemony on the nooks and corners of the globe. By the end of the First World War in 1919, the United States of America has emerged and by the Second World War (1939-1945), it has began to consolidate herself as the most dominant global political force through industrial-military complex. The 20th Century therefore was that of America. At the threshold of the 21st Century, US’s leadership is being contested in scenario and parlance that are still emerging by an economically vibrant China and Japan and by a militarily complex North Korea and Iran, and indeed other lesser states. Who knows whether the 22nd Century is that of Malaysia (economically), Iran, North Korea (militarily) and Turkey (politically). As scholars of society and social realm, we can only conjure for now.

Conclusion
The main motive of this study is the application of the Ibn Khaldun Cyclical Theory on the rise and fall of the Sokoto Caliphate established in West Africa in 1804. The work has shown how the Caliphate rose and consolidated its reign through scholarship, conquest and the administration of justice in all ramifications. At its apogee, in line with the Khaldunian theory it dispensed with justice, organized egalitarian economy, promoted free but vibrant trade, commerce and industries and productive reciprocal diplomacy. However, the farther away the Caliphate from its philosophical foundation and just administrative justice, the farther away it consolidated its reign through scholarship, conquest and the administration of justice in all ramifications.

References
Ahmad, A.S. (2003), Discovering Islam Making Sense of Muslim History and Society, London: Routledge and Regan Paul Ltd


Itzkowit, Norman (1972) *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press


Last, Murray (1967) *The Sokoto Caliphate*, London: Longman


Spahic, Omar (2005) “City Planning in Ibn Khaldun’s Thought”, Paper presented at the 8th *Int’l Conference of the Asian Planning Schools Association* at Universiti Sains Malaysia(USM), Penang, Malaysia, 11-14 September


Ubah, C.N. (1985) *Administration of Kano Emirate under the British, 1900-1930*, Emugu:


The Sokoto Caliphate was an independent Sunni Muslim Caliphate in West Africa that was founded during the jihad of the Fulani War in 1804 by Usman dan Fodio. It was abolished when the British conquered the area in 1903 and established the Northern Nigeria Protectorate. Developed in the context of multiple independent Hausa Kingdoms, at its height, the caliphate linked over 30 different emirates and over 10 million people in the most powerful state in the region and one of the most significant empires. The historian and political theorist Ibn Khaldun was one of the most original thinkers of the 14th century. Living in troubled times and serving a series of noble patrons, he used both written sources and his own observation of politics and society to forge a new discipline, umran, or social science. Now an exhibition in Seville marks the 600th anniversary of his death in 1406 and serves as a timely reminder of a surprisingly modern man and the world that shaped his thinking. Helene Rogers / Alamy. A modern statue of Ibn Khaldun stands in the center of his native city.