The Book and the Sword: Contemporary Attitude Among the Religious-Zionism Sector Toward IDF

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June 2012
Abstract

The following project explores contemporary attitudes toward IDF among dominant thinkers in the Zionist religious sector by analysis of newsletters and newspapers published in the last decade. Our research question is if dominant religious-Zionists thinkers, who are committed to Merkaz Harav’s approach\(^1\), has changed their approach toward the value of serving in the IDF during the last decade, and if so, how we can explain that? The research process revealed that notwithstanding the disengagement plan and Amona confrontations, the basic perception of IDF as a positive organization which carry a religious meaning remains dominant. However, this perception has changed from a holistic perception to more fragment one. By using Freeden's theory of ideologies and Wittgenstein's approach to linguistic research we explained both continuity of main aspects of the ideology in spite the current events, and the changes the content analysis revealed.

Introduction

"Zionism is the entrance of the Jewish people onto history…the Zionist movement intended to renew Judaism…and to create generations who will take responsibility for what they do or not do" (Gershom Scholem, 1994, 56).\(^2\)

The Jewish eschatological dream had two different images. The first image included restoration of ancient times when the Jewish people fought their enemies, while the second one emphasized a universal and pacifistic picture when, in Isaiah words: "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore" (2, 4). The contradiction between those visions became a practical question in the 20th century, when the Zionism movement was established, hence political activism became its dominant goal and the military activity became a real option.

The term 'activism' refers to revolutionaries who seek to change the course of history by any necessary mean, including using military force (Shapira 192, 132). In the Zionists world–reference, this term received positive interpretation since it was a change from the passivity that characterized the Jewish people in exile. Using military

\(^1\) this approach identified with the Kook’s family and we will elaborate in the paper.

\(^2\) See also (Strauss 1965, 4)
force became acceptable among Zionist leaders and thinkers, while simultaneously raising ethical and theological problems.\textsuperscript{3}

The research goal is to explore the attitude of the religious-Zionism thinkers toward using military force. The project questions a widespread perception which associate's religious-Zionists worldview with army service. The Mizrahi founders and its leaders opposed the idea of using force, unless for self defense. In the wake of the six days war, when the sanctification of the army, weapons and soldiers was formulated, this attitude has changed dramatically; nonetheless nowadays it seems that this conception is questioned again by dominant thinkers among the Zionist-religious sector.

The shift in paradigm may be explained by Disengagement plan and Amona confrontations. Those events sign a rift between the Zionist-religious sector and IDF in the dominant public discourse, both in the internal sector arena and the Israeli society one.\textsuperscript{4}

Our research question is if dominant religious-Zionists thinkers, who are committed to Merkaz Harav’s approach\textsuperscript{5}, has changed their approach toward the value of serving in the IDF during the last decade, and if so, how we can explain that? We assume that as a result we will be able to trace changes in the attitude toward IDF. Following this event we hypothesized that the serving in the attitude toward enlisting IDF has changed from the concept of serving as a mitzvah to a concept of serve as a civic duty.

In order to answer the research question we outlined theoretical and analytical bordures. Theoretically, we will examine the attitude toward military activism, before and after the establishment of the State of Israel in the writing of main thinkers of the Zionist-religious sector, noting the important change from pacifism to the sanctification of the army. In the same manner, we will try to examine whether other changes have occurred in the last decade, by examining contemporary texts regarding the subject using a qualitative and quantitative content analysis.

In order to explain patterns which were identified in the content analysis, we used Freeden’s theory of ideology and Wittgenstein’s approach to language. The first one

\textsuperscript{3} Anita Shapira devoted her book, \textit{Land and Power: the Zionist Resort to Force} (1992) to this issue, but she did not discuss the religious-Zionists answer to this conflict.

\textsuperscript{4} See for example http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3140749,00.html, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1377306

\textsuperscript{5} this approach identified with the Kook’s family and we will elaborate in the paper.
contributes to the explanation of change that has occurred in the last decade among Zionist-religious sector, and the second one explore whether the change was simply semantic or indicates a real attitude change. According to Freeden, ideologies consist of certain core concepts whose meaning can change over time, so analysis of an ideology means also analysis of the semantic aspect of it concepts. The semantic analysis relay's on Wittgenstein's thesis of language in which words gain their meaning by the way they are being used.

Content analysis results proved our hypothesis as partly wrong. We discovered a change in the religious-Zionists toward the value of serving in IDF, but not significantly circumstantial. Rather, the results show that while there isn’t a steady change toward the attitude of service as duty, several aspects of the army concept remained steady while other changed over time. Therefore, at least as reflected in the newsletters and the newspaper we read, the Disengagement and Amona confrontation were not followed by abandoning the ideal of service in the IDF is a mitzvah.

The chain of changes occurred in the last decade can be explained as changes in the ideology and not of the ideology. The ideology that sees the serving in the IDF as mitzvah is still dominant, but two different meanings to the word “army” were created. When writers refer to the army negatively, they refer to the high command or to the minister of defense while the attitude toward the soldiers or toward the army in general left as it was.

Theoretical and Analytical Framework
In this chapter we will describe the theoretical and the analytical background concerning the research question. First, we will describe developments within the religious-Zionist thought referring military activism along the years. This part will serve both as a foundation for the research hypothesis and as a source for comparison with today's state of affairs in religious-Zionist thought referring military activism. In order to explain current changes that occurred among the religious-Zionist sector and its attitude toward the army, the second part will focus on theory of ideology and mostly on changes occurring ideologies and possible explanation for the phenomena.

Military Activism in the Religious-Zionists Thoughts
In this section we will examine briefly some key points regarding the problematic of using force in the thoughts of the founders of the Mizrachi, rabbi Abraham Isaac
Kook (RaAYaH: 1865-1935), rabbi Yitzchak Yaakov Reines (1839-1915) and RaAYaH son’s, Zvi Yehuda (1891-1982) and some of his pupils.

In 1770, the Jewish philosopher, Moses Mendelssohn, wrote his friend:

"(the) stress that we (=the Jewish people) lived in so many hundreds years, took us from all the vital force …natural instinct for freedom lost his vigor among us. It is…expressed in prayer and suffering but not in action" (1977, 244).

Mendelssohn points at the harsh conditions of the Jewish people living through the ages as the main reason of their submission. But he was not the first. Spinoza emphasized the role of religion and the Jewish Characters of submission:

"I would go so far as to believe that if the foundations of their religion have not emasculated their minds they may even, if occasion offers, so changeable are human affairs, raise up their empire afresh, and that God may a second time elect them" (Theological-Political treaties 3:104).

And the opportunity arrived. In the 19th century, the modern Jewish nationalism emerged and called for the change of the helpless Jew,6 and also called to act as a collective to achieve Jewish sovereignty. Moreover, this political activism implied another kind of activism: the need to use force.

A Talmudic Midrash (Ketubot 111a) relates God adjured three oaths upon the world. Two of them pertain to the Jewish people that sworn not storm the wall (RaShi interprets: forcefully), and not to rebel against the nations. According to this Midrash, the usage of military force can cause severe religious problem, with which the religious thinkers had to deal.

The first response of the religious-Zionism to the circumstances was delivered by rabbi Reines, the founder of the Mizrachi. He claimed that the mitzvah of settling the land of Israel does not include using force. The conquest of the land of Israel does not necessarily mean conquest by war, but by purchasing the land (1902, 36-37). Hence, Zionism in only a vehicle to promote the mitzvah of settling the land of Israel by political and economic means (Harvey 2004, 310). The idea of "voluntary" reflects his objection to war in general.

6 This is the background for Max Nordao’s call for "Muscular Judaism" (1955, 187-188).
"The war is one of the blacks stains in the humanity…and shame of mankind" (1913, 99), and he continues claiming the origin of war lies in the "lust and wild desire to increase government" (1913, 101).

Therefore Rabbi Reines emphasize political and economic means and limits the mitzvah of settling the land of Israel to agreements between the lands owners and the people of Israel. Thus, according to Rabi Reines there is no inherent problem in the new political activism, as long as it limits itself to political or economic means and doesn't include military means.

RaAYaH also viewed using force problematically. He explains that the people of Israel should not use force since it is inherently against the spirit of the Torah, and in contrary to the salvation process (Kook 1985, 377).

RaAYaH saw Zionism as part of a messianic process symbolizing a teleological idea of progression as Hegel described. According to RaAYaH, the salvation of the Israeli nation has two phases; the first includes returning to the land of Israel and the re-sovereignty of a Jewish state, and the second one contains the salvation of the whole world (1961: 104, 139). Moreover, the messianic process is characterized by the pacifistic influence of Israeli nation on other nations, the gentiles will learn from the people of Israel to abandon the institution of war (1985, 233).

RaAYaH’s attitude toward the salvation process can be seen as a part of his teleological approach regarding the progression of the humankind. In the biblical period the people of Israel had to fight in wars, in the messianic future conflicts between Israel and nations abroad won't be solved by force (1961, 14).

RaAYaH embeds political activism done by Zionism in religious matter and, as noted above, considered it as a part of messianic process. The premise of the messianic vision is that, the fulfillment of the messianic process will occur when political and cultural conditions will enable the people of Israel to return to political activism without the need of military activity. According to RaAYaH, military activism is inconsistent with Jewish tradition. This position, as we saw, held also by rabbi Reines, but he did not use the messianic discourse as RaAYaH did.

This approach was not unique to Kook and Reines. Other thinkers amongst the religious-Zionism held the same position; For example, Rabbi Shmuel Mohilever (1824-1898), the founder of Hovevey Zion, and Rabbi Alexander Moshe Lapidot

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7See also (Kook 1988, 929)
(Mohilever 1891, 9-10; Lapidot 1891, 35). They objected military activism and using force, and treated the Zionist movement only as a political tool to achieve the main goal, the establishment of a Jewish state in the land of Israel, with the permission of the other nation and without military battles. But the reality proved to be different, and the military passivity was abandoned.

**Ideology and Reality: When Book and Sword Collides.**

During the 20's, and following the Arab's riots in Tel Hai and Jaffa (1921), the Yishuv leaders established a Jewish fighting force: the Haganah. The abovementioned Mizrahi and religious-Zionism leaders needed to formulate new theories regarding the problem of using force.

Those circumstances set the foundation for changing the ideal articulated by RaAYiH and his co-thinkers. Isaiah Bernstein (1902-1988), one of the founders of Hapoel HaMizrachi, claimed that although bloodshed is against the Jewish nature "we are not commanded by the Torah…not to fight for our existence and not to defend ourselves" and therefore military activity is necessary for surviving (1939, 37).

This position was also promoted by the chief Rabbinate of Israel. The chief rabbi Yitzhak HaLevi Herzog (1886- 1959) and the Rishon Lezion rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel spoke in favor of self-protection and the Haganah (Herzog 1939, 42; Uziel 1939, 68-70). It turned out, that it was impossible to establish an independent Jewish state without using force; Political activism and military activity came together.

Furthermore, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda, RaAYH's son, started to ascribe a religious meaning to military action. In March 1948, two month before the establishment of the state of Israel, he argued that part of the Jewish salvation is military activism (Kook 2002, 151). According to Rabbi Zvi Yehuda, the new Jewish identity, created by the Zionism, contains also an inherent component of military activism (2002, 217).

In contrary to his father, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda pleader, that military activity is part of the mitzvah of settling the land of Israel (Kook 1995, 5; 1991, 26-32). The overwhelming victorious in the Six days war lead Rabbi Zvi Yehuda to proclaim for the sanctity of the army: "the state need the army and therefore the army is holy"

8 See also (Kook 2002, 164).
According to Rabbi Zvi Yehuda the wars of the Jewish state are equivalent to the wars of the Messiah, and every victory is a sign to the presence of God and consider as Kiddush Hashem. This approach soon led to sanctification of the soldiers and of weapons. "Every gun that is inserted into the Israeli army", he wrote, "is really a spiritual phase".

The attitude toward use of military force changed from necessary evil to process inherent to the Jewish salvation and has ramifications on military activism. It is still dominant nowadays, as shown by some arguments made by rabbi Zvi Yehuda’s pupils. For example, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, the Rosh Yeshiva of the Ateret Cohanim Yeshiva and the rabbi of Beit El, claimed:

"We need to dwell in Israel even at the cost of war. Moreover…we need to initiate war to conquer it. Without this land we cannot be called the people of Israel." In addition, Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, a former politician reprehensive of the Tehiya party who served as a Knesset member in 1984 and 1990, argued that proving military bravery is an integral part of the Jewish redemption; Rabbi Eliezer Melamd, the Rosh Yeshiva of the Har Brachah Yeshiva, claimed that serving in the army is a mitzvah since a strong army will deterred Israel's enemy's fighting Israel.

To summarize the description of changes which occurred regarding the issue of military activism; the founding fathers of the Mizrachi envision the future establishment of the Jewish state as a merely political activity. New political condition forced their successors to formulate a new concept regarding using military force. They accepted military activity as necessary, but they limited it to self-defense. Rabbi Zvi Yehuda, and his pupils, developed a new aggressive ethos that relies on the idea, that use of force is an integral part of the national renaissance of the Jewish people. We would like to explore the ideology of religious meaning of the IDF created by Rabbi Zvi Yehuda and its ramification by using a theory of ideology.

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9 See also (Kook 1985, 11-20; 1986, 90)
10 See also Hanan Porat (1982, 28). This conception of the land and the connection between the land and the nation is similar to the theory of the state by Hegel. Hegel claimed that the state is the fulfillment of a divine ideal and that a nation without a state is in lower level of development (Hegel 2011, 331).
11 In this paper we focused on one approach toward the army which we think is central in the Zionist-religious sector, thus quoted these prominent public figures regarding the issue. We are aware of other approaches toward use of force among this sector and of influential rabbis who opposed this attitude such as rabbi Yehuda Amital and rabbi Avigdor Amiel. See for example (Amiel 1937, 41; Amiel 1943, 286-288; Amiel 1977, 5; Amital 1982, 8-11; Amital 1983, 34-54).
**Theory of Ideology**

Theories concerning the links between ideas and reality are varied. Some thinkers like Leo Strauss argues that ideas affect reality,\(^\text{12}\) while Gademar's approach emphasis the opposite: life affects the way one understand the world, one's concept and perspective. In this paper we will adapt a mediate approach.\(^\text{13}\) We claim reality has an impact on shaping ideas; however simultaneously ideas can change the actual behavior. The real world frame the concepts in which one understands the world, but concepts can be understood differently within the general frame based on reality.

The further section will explore a theory of ideology which will serve later as a basis for interpretation of processes which occurred in the Zionist- religious sector regarding the ideology of army service, in which on the one hand reality events shaped ideology, and on the other the ideological concepts remain steady and framed those events in a different way.

Political scientists from several schools explored and interpreted the term of ideologies in the last two hundreds year, and changed it dramatically.

Since the mid-19\(^\text{th}\) century the most dominant school of interpretation of ideologies was the Marxist school. Marx and Engels consider ideology as a mean of sublimation of the martial life under the role of capitalism. The role of ideology is to smooth over contradiction by making them appear as necessary and normal. It serves as a mechanism of maintaining social unity. Another important aspect of their thesis was the association of ideology and class, asserting that the ideas of the ruling class were the ruling ideas (Freeden 2003, 9-10).

Other social science schools considered ideologies as unscientific concepts since they contain contradictions and ambiguous ideas. For example, the behaviorist's school developed a positivist approach toward ideologies. Ideologies can't be studied scientifically, however its' external visible symptoms could: therefore developed a tendency to accord ideology through narrowing it's domain to that of observable representations (Freeden 2006, 6-7). Contemporary researchers tend to approach ideology as a legitimate concept for study and mostly the hermeneutic and political philosophy schools tend to deal with the subject.

\(^\text{12}\) See for example (Luz 2001, 5-8, 15, 26; Strauss 2001, 112-123).

\(^\text{13}\) See for example (Gadamer 1976, 9; 2004, 278, 301).
As a result of the varied approaches toward research of ideologies there are several definitions of the concept. In this research we will rely on Freeden's definition for ideology as a wide ranging structural arrangement that attributes meaning to a range of mutually defining political concepts.

Freeden claims that one of the basic characterization of ideology is its fluidity. Freeden focuses on the morphology of ideology, the internal structure of ideologies which contains core political concepts. Those concepts convey their meaning by both the relationship among the concepts within the ideology, and by the meaning they receive at a specific situation from several possible interpretations (Freeden 2003, 51-54).

Freeden inspiration for the morphology approach came from developments in linguistic arena especially Wittgenstein approach to language. Wittgenstein, in his *Philosophical Investigations (PI)*, opposed the idea that the meaning of a word determined by the object it points at.\(^4\) For example the meaning of the word "chair" is the object with four legs and the back rest. Wittgenstein proceeds to offer a new way of understanding language which connects meaning and use:

> For a *large* class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in language" (*PI*, 43).\(^5\)

In this statement, Wittgenstein changed the conception of meaning as representation toward a view of meaning as use. Determine the meaning of a word should be done vis-à-vis particular cases and not by an explanatory generalization:

> "Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games"…what is common to them all? – don’t say "there must be something common…but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all…don’t think but look!..."(*PI*, 66).

In other words generalization must be replaced by a particular description of use that can be change from person to person; the meaning of words is determined by their social context and usage.

In order to demonstrate the countless multiplicity of uses Wittgenstein developed his key concept of language game (*PI*, 7). Language and the usage of words should be seen as an activity analogous to the game rules; the use of language,

\(^4\) See (*PI*, 3;32)

\(^5\) Emphasis in original.
just like a game, is a social human activity that generally waged by rules and at the same time gives a lot of room to all sorts of meaning. "What is supposed to show what they (=words) signified", He wonder, "if not the kind of use they have" (*PI*, 10).\(^{16}\)

The different kinds of use depend on what Wittgenstein refers as "form of life" (*PI*, 23).\(^{17}\) This term connotes to the sociological, psychological, historical and other aspects in which the language receive the meaning from, and of course this form of life vary from one to person to another.\(^{18}\) Thus, the nature of a Wittgensteinian approach to discourse analysis lies on the facts that one should identify the 'language-game’, meaning the particular meaning one gives to a word or to a concepts.

In sum of this section, we split the theoretical sections into two parts; the first part of the theoretical background serves as a foundation for formulating the research hypothesis while the last part explains the results. By using Wittgenstein and Freeden's approaches we can gain a better understanding of the possibility of ideologies to carry multiplicity of meaning through a minor tweaking of words and concepts they utilize, and also to explain changes within ideologies (Freeden 2003, 43-46).

**Assumptions**

This research contains two main assumptions regarding the current attitude toward service in IDF among elites in the Zionist-religious sector.

First, we presume that the dominant attitude toward the issue until the last decade was a positive one. IDF was considered as an important organization and enlisting it was attributed with concepts which carry a religious meaning for example Kdusha. Serving in IDF was perceived as a mechanism of fulfillment several Mitzvoth such as settling the land of Israel, solidarity etc.

Second, we assume that as a result of current events such the Disengagement plan and the Amona confrontations this attitude had changed during the last decade.\(^{19}\)

\(^{16}\) Though he says that there are rules, Wittgenstein stressed out that these rules are vague and blurry and they can not be otherwise (*PI*, 100-101). See also (Biletzki and Matar 2011).

\(^{17}\) See also "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" (*PI*, 19).

\(^{18}\) On this interpretation, see also (Biletzki and Matar 2011).

\(^{19}\) The disengagement plan, enacted in August 2005, resettled all Israelis, most of them were religious-Zionists, from Gaza strip and from four settlements in the west bank including Amona. In this paper we focused mainly at one aspect which is the attitude toward the army and soldiers that evacuate the settlers.
We assume the positive attitude had changed into more skeptic attitude; furthermore, the image of the army as a positive organization with theological meaning will be damaged. In other words, the perception of service in IDF has deteriorated from perception of Mitzvah to a perception of a civic duty, which has no religious meaning. It perceived as part of obedience to state laws, instead of mechanism of fulfillment of higher goals.

In addition we expect to find more radical statements which will interpret the current political events as an end of era. Calls to stop serve in IDF since it lost all religious meaning will be heard, however this calls will be a marginal and won't affect the general and acceptable attitude toward IDF.  

Methodology
The main methodology which was used in this research is the content analysis method. Content analysis enables the researcher to identify characterization of messages within the text in a systematic and reliable procedure (Bauer and Gaskell 2011, 153).

This research is based upon Krippendorff's basic strategy of trend analysis which sees the corpus as an open system in which researchers identify changes and processes that occurred within time. A sample of texts is encoded systematically in order to reveal inherent changes in the texts toward the dependant variable. The analysis focused on both the semantic dimension of the text and the syntactic one. The syntactic analysis examined both the vocabulary and the frequency of usage of certain words and phrases, while the semantic analysis examined the process of structuring meaning of words and phrases within the text (Bauer and Gaskell 2011, 155-156).

The corpus of the research was built in adequacy with the research question thus focuses on internal discourse of elites among the Zionist religious sector. The corpus contains two weekly newsletters that were published during the last decade: "Olam Katan" and "Shabat Beshabato". In addition it contains the weekly newspapers "Beshava". The newsletters are common phenomena in the Zionist-religious sector; More than 15 newsletters are being published every weekend and handed in synagogues. They serve as a platform for public discourse on current affairs and on

See for example Rabbi Shmuel Tal the Rosh Yeshiva of Torat Hahaim in Gush Katif, calling for more drastic measure toward the army and the state, but he is unique so we won't relate to him.  
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3526098,00.html
basic values among the Zionist-religious community. In most cases the writers are part of the political or religious elite of the community. Those resources are identified with different groups among the Zionist-religious sector therefore they enabled us to gain a wide perspective on changes that occurred within the sector in the last decade.

The trend analysis model focuses on small amount of observation in a long period of time (Bauer and Gaskell 2011, 167). In this research we used a non representative sample and examined items that were published from 2003 until 2010 alternately. The sample contains 29 items when two items were taken from "Besheva" and another two items were taken from the newsletters for each year in the sample according to the relative length of each source.

We used 9 measures in order to build an index of the positive attitude toward the army in the discourse among elites in the Zionist-religious sector. The index contains measures which examine different aspects of the attitude toward IDF as a positive organization.

The measures were created respectively with the theoretical background of the research. The literature review of the development of the attitude toward IDF and military force revealed a change which occurred since 1967. This perception developed mostly by Rabbi Zvi Yehuda, attributed serving in IDF with a religious meaning of fulfillment of holy deeds. In order to estimate the attitude toward the army in the last decade we tried to examine whether the discourse in the resources remained similar. A set of measures evaluated the level of religious meaning of the army. This set of measures focuses on the vocabulary and terminology of the writers for example the usage of the words holiness (Kdusha) or good deed (Mitzvah) referring IDF. Using this terminology indicates a religious meaning which is attributed with IDF. This measures are nominal variables which received the values of 0-no and 1-yes.

The perception mentioned above considers IDF as an inherent part of the salvation process. Another set of measures examined the context which was attributed to description of IDF. We examines whether a usage of biblical phrases and citation or positive historical examples was made. Hence, indicates a perception of IDF as an organization which has an important role in the history of the Jewish nation. For example comparing IDF to King David's soldiers or to the Maccabees indicates such

See appendix.
perception. This measures are nominal variables which received the values of 0-no and 1-yes.

In addition, another set of measures focused on perception of IDF commend as an obligatory commend. Attributing a religious meaning to IDF influences not only the terminology of the writer but also his perception of legitimate action. Whether the army has a religious meaning, contradictions between the Halakha and army commands can be mediate since both commands belong to the same value system. However, a lack of such meaning will encourage a refusal to follow army orders in cases of conflict. Several measures tried to figure the writers perception in cases of conflict between IDF commands and the halakhic world. The first one examined the basic attitude toward refusal to follow order without a specific context; some examined a preference of a Halakah over a command and another measured a preference of the rabbinic figure over the commander one in cases of contradicting orders. For example whether the writer justifies a refusal to follow order in every contradiction between Halakah and commands, or whether he advises to try to find a solution within the unit. Or does the writer mentions names of soldiers who refused to follow order as positive figures? Does he advise soldiers to consult with their rabbis in internal unit's issue or to receive their commanders as the legitimate figures within the units? These variables are interval variables which were scaled from 1 to 5 while 1 represent the least favorable attitude toward IDF command and commanders and 5 the most favorable one.

The last set of measures examined the emotional expressions toward IDF referring both IDF as an organization and toward soldiers as individuals. Pervious researches indicate a change in the emotional identification with IDF following the disengagement plan and Amona. Those measures, however, examine another dimension of the perception of IDF: its symbolic meaning. Michael Walzer claims that every political institution relays on a symbolic images which provides the meaning to the concept. This symbolic activity has an important compound of engaging emotions of identification and unitary. It also provides a starting point for the political thinking (Walzer 1967, 194-196).

Thus, by examining the personal feelings IDF as an institution evokes along with the feeling toward soldiers as individuals, one can learn about IDF status within

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22 Yair Sheleg (2007, 92) for instance claimed that after the disengagement plan some religious-Zionists refused to drive hitchhiking soldiers.
the Zionist-religious sector. For instance usage of terminology such as love, admire or respect regarding IDF or soldiers, or expressing personal identification by regarding to soldiers as the community's sons, brothers etc. These variables are interval variables which were scaled from 1 to 5 while 1 represent the least favorable attitude toward IDF soldiers and organization and commanders and 5 the most favorable one.

The encoding processes scored each item individually, and afterwards the results were transferred to a 0-1 scale and each year received a mean score. The reliability of the index was tested by the acceptable reliability test of Alpha-Cronabach while Alpha=0.802. This result conducts that the scale which was created in this research is strongly reliable and measures different aspects of the same phenomena; therefore the scale has a strong internal validation.

Two coders participated in the process of encoding the 29 items, while 6 items were encoded by both coders in order to achieve a sufficient internal reliability between encoders. In order to assure an internal reliability between coders a Kappa test was executed. The result for six out of nine measures was 1, two measures received a 0.5 value and for one measure the test was not executed. The mean score of the Kappa test was 0.85 which indicates a high level of internal reliability between encoders.

**Findings**

The scale of positive attitude toward IDF was created from the 9 measures as mention above; it contains values from 0 to 1. The descriptive statistics of the scale contains the following details: the mean value is 0.41, median is 0.37 (both represent medium level of positive attitude toward IDF) and the standard variation is 0.25 .The range is 0.81.when the minimum value is 0.04 and maximum one is 0.85.

In addition, the scale contains 19 levels and has non-normal distribution. 38% of the items represented levels of weak positive attitude toward the army (results from 0.04 to 0.32), a little more than a quarter of the items represented a medium level of positive attitude toward the army (results from 0.33-0.54), 14% items represented a medium-high level of positive attitude toward the army (results from 0.55-0.75), while the rest 19% items represented a high positive attitude level toward the army (0.76-1).
Each item received a value in the scale, and the mean value of each year was calculated according to the relevant results. The results are demonstrated in the following chart:

The mean results of each year were on a scale from 0 to 1 (from the weakest positive attitude level toward army to the highest level) as following: on 2003-0.41, on 2005-0.4, on 2006-0.52, on 2007-0.51, on 2008-0.19, on 2009-0.6, on 2010-0.38. Between the years 2003 until 2007 we find a steady level of medium positive attitude toward IDF. From 2008 we find changes from a weak positive attitude to a high positive one alternately. However, considering the small sample size it's hard to infer results regarding specific years. The calculated mean of the attitude toward the army during the relevant period is 0.42, and it remains similar to the results received at the beginning of the decade and the last part of it. While the mean score for 2003-2006 is 0.44 the mean score for 2007-2010 is 0.42. Therefore a closer look at the data contributes an interesting insight which will explain both changes the content analysis sample revealed and the steady calculated mean.

Examining the results of each measure independently reveals an interesting pattern. Certain measures tend to stay steady along the period while other changes more rapidly. The measure of attitude toward soldiers as individuals remains steady along the period. The results are calculated on a mean score from 0 to 1 while 1 represent the most favorable attitude toward soldiers and 0 the least favorable one. In 2003 the mean result was 0.8, in 2005 0.7, in 2006-0.875, in 2007 0.7, in 2008-0.5, in
The mean score for the decade is 0.75 which represent a high favorable attitude toward IDF soldiers. The mean result of the first part of the decade (2003-2006) is 0.79 and the mean result of the last part of the era (2007-2010) is 0.72. The attitude toward soldiers as individuals remains steady along the relevant period.

Other measures tend to change more rapidly and the most unsteady results were received from two measures: the attitude toward army command as an obligatory command in cases of conflict between army and Halakahic orders, and the attitude toward army commanders as the highest authority figures in cases of conflict between army and Halakaic figures. A mean result of those two indicators was calculated and it represents the attitude toward army authority regarding both commands and commanders: In 2003-0.5, 2005-1, 2006-0.62, 2007-0.62, 2008-0.39, 2009-0.4, 2010-0.25. The mean result of the period is 0.51 which represent a medium favorable attitude toward army authority regarding both commands and commanders. This mean result is 25% lower than the mean result calculated from the attitude toward soldiers as individual measure. The mean score of the first half of the decade is 0.7 (2003-2006) while the second half received a mean result of 0.41. In the second half of the decade the attitude toward army authority was deteriorate in almost 40%.
Inadequately with research assumptions, the results reveal that in the last decade the basic perception of elites among the Zionist-religious sector regarding the image of IDF haven't change. The steady mean score of the scale infers that in general the perception of the army as a positive organization which carries a religious meaning was held. In spite the confrontations between IDF forces and groups who belong to the Zionist-religious sector during the implantation of the disengagement plan and Amona events the basic perception remains positive. Nonetheless, examining the content analysis categories separately revealed changes which occur within time. The attitude toward IDF did not remain holistic but have different aspects. The writers perceive soldiers as individuals as a positive aspects of the concept, while the aspects regarding army's authority tend to deteriorate with time.

The assumption claims that the attitude toward the army will deteriorate with time as a result of the political events and the conformation between IDF forces and large parts of the Zionist-religious sector. However, the result proven the assumption was too dichotomous for the complexity of the concept.

In addition, in 2005-6, the years in which the disengagement plan and Amona conformation took place the attitude toward the army remained in a similar level to results accepted all along the decade. Nonetheless, the results of the measures of army authority in the era following these events indicated that they did affected IDF image but not in the same manner accepted in the research assumption. Therefore, Causativeness factors alone can't explain the current changes in the perception of IDF in the Zionist-religious sector and other possible explanations needs to be considered.
We would like to claim that the chain of changes occurred in the last decade can be explained as changes in the ideology and not of the ideology. When different writers use the notion "army" or IDF they use the same technical term but it carries different and varied meanings. The phrase can refer to different groups within the army and to other population and organizations which are connect to IDF but aren’t inherent part of IDF. Each interpretation of the phrase army receives different treatment.

In several cases the phrase "army" is associated with the soldiers who carry out security missions. These soldiers fulfill orders and have a close connection with the civic population in the ground. The image of this group is of simple soldiers who carry out missions, endangering their lives and contribute to the state security. Thus, the attitude toward this group is positive and supporting. Examples of this attitude can be seen in the following cases. In an article from February 2009 in "Olam Katan" newsletter:

"Danny, Gaie, Yarden, Matan, Segal, Andry, Yosi, Metreaso…We were all torn off from our lives. We didn't receive any warning and we left our wives and children, business and jobs…we are all here waiting to enter Gaza. we are ready and we understand the meaning of this step…no one dears to say he wants to defeat the evil in the world and purify it as part of our holy mission but it is obvious we are all here for that".23

Rabi Eliezer Melamed wrote in "Besheva" newspaper an answer to a dilemma which was brought up in 2005, and he distinguishes between the soldiers and officer commanders in IDF. The last group is accused of the sin of the disengagement while the other one remains in the consensus.

"Q: shell I enlistee to reserve duty after the disengagement plan from Gaza?
A: first we must clarify that enlisting IDF is a Mitzvah from the Torah...all the other good deed which a man does are private affairs, while this good deed involves the nation as a whole therefore the wars of the Israeli nation is the war of god. This attitude is relevant even in these days since the main purpose of the army is to protect the Israeli nation and the land of Israel. However, we can't ignore the sin of the disengagement... We are praying that
the commanders of IDF will regret this particular action and will return in Teshuva".

In other cases the phrase army refers to the commanders, especially the high chain of commanders. This interpretation of the phrase ‘army’ receives less support since the image of this group is associated with the political authorities and the usage of soldiers for political missions. Some examples of this attitude can be found in Zevulon Orlev writing in "Shabat Beshabato" newsletter in 18/08/2007:

"This attitude (of the Zionist-religious sector toward IDF and it's commends) has boundaries. The government, the minister of security and the general staff's decision to use military forces in the evacuation of Jewish families in Hebron, violated the local commander promise and is a condiment decision…IDF soldiers must focus on preparations for security missions.

In addition rabbi Eliezer Melamed wrote in his weekly column in Besheva newspaper (23.8.2007):

Q: If many soldiers will oppose evacuation commends the army structure may be harmed. What shall we do?

A: If many soldiers will oppose, the command will be canceled or the high chain of command will have to resign, and this is a desirable outcome. Most officers in these ranks are too involved in politics. They can't lead IDF to win wars, as proven in the 2nd Lebanon war…an extreme example for this occurred in the Russian army. Between the world wars most of the Bolshevik army high commanders were appointed due to their political connections… when the 2nd world war broke the red army failed to win battles until all the high chain of command, the political one, was replaced."

Another example of the ambivalent attitude toward army is Rabi Elyakim Levanon reaction regarding few soldiers' act of protest against IDF involvement in evacuation of Jewish settlements in Samaria during a swearing ceremony in 09.11.2009:

"Q: Why this kind of protest is needed? can't we simply ignore problematic missions instead?"

See also (Melamed 10.2.06 and 7.8.06; Shilo 12.8.07).
A: It all starts at the top, which in this case is distorted. The security mistier stands beside those actions...he involves IDF in his personal politics...he has political and electoral problem therefor he tries to take advantage of the soldiers and gain support from the public.

In this example the "army" concept has both a negative and a neutral meaning. The negative meaning attributes IDF with the political institutions and the neutral meaning when the concept refers to soldiers.

**Discussion**

The change which was discovered in the attitude of the elites among Zionist-religious sector can be partly attributed to the different language game in which the phrase 'army' was used. In Freeden's theory the basic structure of ideologies contains core concepts which attribute meaning to each other. This flexibility of meaning indicated that ideologies can't be pinned down univocally since they carry multiple meanings. In order to understand the specific meaning one must take the context into consideration. Wittgenstein invented the term "language games" thus creating a mean of comprehension of specific meaning in context. Following these approaches we examined the concept "IDF" and the multiple meaning it carries, and we find it crucial for understating the change revealed by the content analysis.

The discourse of attitude toward Israeli army follows this diagnosis and uses the same word and in the same time refers to it in different ways. In several cases the phrase "army" refers to soldiers who carry out the security missions, in other cases the phrase is attributed to the high chain of command, and sometimes it refers to the political institutions and politicians. The last two are ascribe with the processes of decisions making and policy design. Each interpretation of the concept received a different attitude. The soldiers' interpretation achieved support and sympathy; furthermore it was ascribed with a religious meaning, while the other two interpretations provoked concern and a skeptic attitude toward IDF.

Freeden's theory of flexibility of ideologies focuses on this mechanism of multiple meaning. This mechanism enables ideologies to change with time and adapt new meanings and ideas, while simultaneously use the same terminology thus insuring an image of coherence and continuity. In our research, the flexibility of the meanings attributed to the concept "army" enables elites from the Zionist-religious
sector to preserve the common ideological line. The army can still be seen as an organization with a religious meaning in spite the changes that have occurred in reality. Thus, the circumstances and the political events alone can't explain the attitude toward IDF and ideology as a mediating factor has an important role in shaping both patterns of thought and norms.

As noted above, we adapted a mediating approach regarding the link between ideas and reality. The impact of reality upon the ideology of religious meaning of IDF was demonstrated above. The attitude toward several aspects of the army concept has changed in the years following the disengagement plan and Amona. Nonetheless, we can identify an opposite influence in which ideological concepts frame reality. The standards for judgment of army's action are ideological standards. In cases the army's action is perceived as adequate with the ideological approach the concept gains a positive meaning. On the other, when army's actions are perceived as contradict to the ideological standards it gains criticism and skeptic attitude.

Conclusion
In this work we examined whether a change in attitude of serving in the IDF have occurred amongst the religious-Zionism sector, after the Disengagement plan and Amona confrontations. At first glance, it seems that a change has occurred. But, following Freeden’s theory of ideology and Wittgenstein approach to language, we found that our first assumption was partially wrong.

The change was not a change in the ideology, from the conception of serving in the IDF as mitzvah to a perception of serving in the IDF as a civic duty. Rather, the serving in the IDF remains sacred but the attitude toward the high command has change. The religious-Zionists differentiated between the army, the ordinary soldiers, and his leaders (politicians and commanders).

The work begins with a theoretical background relating the thoughts of the founder of the Mizrachi (rabbi Reines and RaAYaH), regarding the issue of use of force before the establishment of the state of Israel. Then we proceed to examined Rabbi Zvi Yehuda’s attitude toward the IDF, the change from pacifism dominant in his father’s thought, to a sanctification of the weapons and of soldiers. Afterwards, we explained the analytical framework and our methodology in which we used.

Walter Benjamin in his essay " Illuminations: Essays and Reflection ", describe the Angelus Novus, the angel of history:
A Klee painting named Angelus Novus shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress (2007, 257-258).

This work is written, then in the ‘past’. A further research needs to be done in order to gain wider perspective and determine whether this change is only a passing trend or it is a process that only has begun. In case this phenomenon will turn out as permanent there is a need to reconsider it as an ideological change.
לדף קידוד

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