SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE QUESTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, ANTI-RACISM AND GENDER RELATIONS

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Paul Gilroy found (already in 1987) the ‘anti-racist strategy’ to be highly problematic. Bob Miles, in (1993) contemplated racism – and the fight against it - beyond the ‘race relations paradigm’ which has dominated the British anti-racist movement in some form or another since the 1960s. Michel Wieviorka (1997) has argued that following the rise of new racism, which does not necessarily use the terminology of ‘race’, it is not as easy to detect, as it used to be, the difference between racists and anti-racists. In the 1990s ‘racism is said to be everywhere, including among those whose intention it is to combat it; the references are confused while, at the same time, the evil is perceived as gaining ground (1997:141).

Obviously, such statements reflect a paradigmatical shift in the thinking about racism as well as anti-racism and need further reflection upon. This has been given further impetus by the Stephen Lawrence Murder Inquiry report (Macpherson, 1999, see also the special issue of Sociological Review on Line, Spring 1999) and the ways the public, the media and the state have been responding to it. The aim of this article is to examine what the new discourses around the notion of citizenship could offer to such a rethinking. It also aims to highlight the gendered nature of both citizenship and racism which needs to be incorporated to any rethinking about anti-racism.

Following the decline of class struggle and the rise of identity politics with their own particularistic agendas, citizenship discourse has gradually become the main inclusionary emancipatory discourse of the Left. None the less, as Hall and Held commented (1989), it was questions of immigration and racism that have kept debates on citizenship going before it became a fashionable discourse in the late 80s. If there is any common goal to anti-racist
thought it is to enable all people in the society to be full and active citizens (Jayasuriya, 1991), to remove the fixed, immutable and naturalized boundaries of otherness that processes of racialization involve (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992). The political and theoretical debates that are taking place concerning questions of equality and difference to which Wieviorka alludes to, relate to the questions of what such an inclusive notion of citizenship might mean, as well as to the ways required to go about achieving it.

The paper relates to some of the major theories and debates on citizenship that have taken place within various disciplines, such as political sciences (in particular the debates between liberals, republicans and communitarians); sociology and social policy (especially Marshall, 1950; Edwards, 1988 and Turner, 1990); and pluralists (eg Kymlicka, 1995; Jayasuriya, 1991 and Young, 1989). Feminists have been at the forefront of these debates (eg Pateman, 1988; Lister, 1997; and the Greenwich conference on Women, Citizenship and Difference (publications that grew out of this conference are the special issue of Feminist Review, 1997 and Yuval-Davis & Werbner, 1999)).

Out of these debates, the chapter will tease out the specific issues that are important for a construction of a citizenship-oriented antiracist gendered approach. In particular, issues relating to boundaries of collectivities (sub-, cross- and supra- as well as national); equality and difference and the relationship between the notions of citizenship and human rights. Its main argument is that an anti-racist gendered notion of citizenship needs to be that of a multi-layered citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1999a). Such a notion of citizenship recognizes, without essentializing and reifying, the different positionings of the different citizens. It also acknowledges that today, more than ever before, states are not the only polities in which people are citizens, although they often are still the most powerful ones. An anti-racist gendered notion of citizenship is a dialogical transversal citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1997a&b; Soundings, 1999; Yuval-Davis & Werbner, 1999) that takes into consideration power relations between collectivities as well as between individuals, but does not confuse positionings with identities.

The nature of contemporary citizenship

The renewed interest in issues of citizenship accompanied the rise of ‘the politics of recognition’ (Taylor, 1994). In this politics, marginal elements in the society who were previously excluded, formally or informally, from participation in the public political arena, have fought their way, largely by means of identity politics social movements, into social and political recognition. Part of this process has been women’s legal emancipation. Another has been the establishment of multiculturalism as a transformative project of the welfare state (Schierup, 1995), especially in Anglo-Saxon states.

This transformative project has been taking place in the context of the far reaching political and social restructuring which accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the rise of neo-liberal globalization and the abandonment of class as the major tool of political resistance
and organisation. These geo-political changes have also affected the nature of citizenship itself (Turner, 1998). However, the association of citizenship with 'nation-states' constructs an image in which the globe is divided into different territories, each of which belongs to a nation, which ideally has its own state. The reality, of course, has always been very far from such a fiction. There have always been waves of immigration of population from one country to another, as a result of wars, natural disasters, persecution of particular religious or ethnic minorities and poverty. The association of specific nations to specific territories and specific states, has always been a result of particular cultural-political processes and often contested.

Many people whose countries were under European rule before and after independence, immigrated to western countries. They, and other migrants from marginal European and Middle Eastern countries were recruited to work in western countries in the post 2nd World War expanding economies, and became its new ethnic minorities from the 1960’s onwards (Castles & Miller, 1993). The members of these new ethnic communities established themselves in new diasporic communities and their membership in their states of residence needs to be understood from their specific historical, cultural and often legal positions in the country, as well as in their relationships to their countries of origin (Brah, 1996). The demise of the 'iron curtain' and the many regional wars in Southern Europe, the Middle East and in Africa, have added and accelerated these waves of international migration of both labourers and especially of asylum seekers and refugees. The rise of new 'tiger economies' have directed immigrants to countries which traditionally were not used to recruit external migrant labour. As Castles and Miller point out, contemporary international migration tend to be globalized, to and from a broad spectrum of countries, it is growing in number and is led by a variety of motivations, skills and countries of origin. Many of these migrations are gender specific and even when formally not, as in the case of political refugees, women often encounter specific difficulties (eg when both husband and wife were active politically and the refugee status is given formally to the husband who later dies, the wife and children can be left without formal licence to stay and face the risk of deportation) (SBS, 1990).

Formal citizenship is normally associated with the right to carry a passport of a specific state, which normally identifies them as 'belonging' to a specific nation-state. One of the signals of the super-state nation building of 'Europe' has been the issue of a European passport for all EU members. While the formal intention has been to establish a 'borderless Europe', the transfer of responsibility of illegal immigration to the flight and shipping companies, has resulted in many cases with even more scrupulous checking of passports than before. An international system of stratification has been created, at the top of which are found western passports which can almost always guarantee their carriers the right of free international movements and at the bottom of which are those who have no right to carry any passport at all. While new legislations in the 1980’s have given to women for the first time the independent right to transfer citizenship to their children, other children, born to non resident mothers were deprived from a right to any formal nationality (Bhabha & Shutter,1994). Parallely there has been a growth in the number of people who carry two, three or even more passports of different states. Interestingly, the practice of issuing passports, although so
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thoroughly 'naturalized', is only about a hundred years old and the use of passports as a way of controlling immigration is even younger.

Norman Tebbit, an ex-minister in Thatcher's government, argued that the support of British citizens of South Asian origin to the cricket teams of their countries of origin, proves that they are not loyal British citizens, much to their indignation and resistance. In many parts of the world there exist immigrant communities that are culturally and politically committed to continue to 'belong' to their 'mother country' - or more specifically to the national collectivity from where they, their parents or their foreparents, have come. At the same time they see their own and their children's future as bound with the country where they live. When examining issues of citizenship of those migrants and their children, therefore, one needs to take into consideration not only their formal and informal status in the countries where they live, but also that in their countries of origin as well. Probably most important in determining it would be the relationships between the two countries and their relative position of power in the international social order. A comparison between the relative power and freedom of, for example, a white American male student and a Somali woman refugee living in London, could illustrate this most forcefully.

Another whole set of citizenship issues is related to indigenous minorities in Settler Societies. The age of western imperialism and colonialism has created 'settler societies', sponsored by European empires in South and North America, South and North Africa, Australia and New Zealand (Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis, 1995). In these states the indigenous populations were often persecuted, exploited, exterminated and in some cases until today have not received full citizenship rights. Moreover, indigenous peoples' movements have tended to challenge the whole basis of legitimacy of the settler societies states and see themselves as citizens in the communities of the stateless societies which existed in these countries before colonialism (eg Dickanson, 1992, Reynolds, 1996).

However, it is not just that in many societies indigenous populations have been very late, if at all, entrants to the formal citizenship body of the state. It is that if their claim on the country- in the form of land rights, was to be taken seriously and in full, this would totally conflict with the claim of the settler national collectivity for legitimacy. Attempts to solve the problem by transforming the indigenous population into another 'ethnic minority' have usually met with a strong and understandable resistance (de Lepervanche, 1980). Formal treaties, which would institutionalize and anchor in law the relations between what Australian Aboriginals have been calling 'the imposing society' and the indigenous people, often create a complex situation in which there exist two national sovereign entities over the same territory. One that owns the state and one that attempts to establish a sovereign stateless society within it. There is a need to explore the implications of such conflicts for the citizenship of both the 'indigenous' and the settler communities, both in relation to their own communities and in relation to the state. (Kymlicka’s (1995) and Taylor’s (1994) proposals in this respect are far from satisfactory – as will be discussed later on in the paper.)

Somewhat similar, if less racialized, struggles are present in the many regionalist secessionist or irredentist movements which claim the right of national self determination vis-
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a-vis their states which themselves have been constructed as nations. Such movements can be found both in Europe and in outside it [eg in Northern Ireland, Former Yugoslavia, Quebec, Kurdistan, Northern Sahara, East Timor]. The legitimacy and state of the struggle would determine the relationships between the citizenship of people in the two contesting collectivities. Their fate might be determined these days more and more by intervention of international NGOs and governmental agencies (probably the most extreme intervention of this kind to date has been in Kosovo).

The constraints on the state in many of the post-colonial states, by local and traditional communities on the one hand and multi-nationals and international agencies on the other hand, would be even more noticeable than in the West. As a result of the above, I’ve been arguing (1991,1997a&b,1999a) that citizenship needs to be understood as a multi-layered construct. One’s citizenship in collectivities in the different layers – local, ethnic, national, state, cross- or trans-state and supra-state is affected and often at least partly constructed by the relationships and positionings of each layer in specific historical contexts. This is of particular importance if we want to examine citizenship in a non westocentric way. Recent technological, economic and political developments have enhanced the need for such an analytical perspective.

The debate on citizenship and difference

The liberal theory of citizenship has been challenged from a variety of directions. One of the central debates in Political Sciences, especially in the USA, has been the debate between the Liberals on the one hand and the Republicans and Communitarians on the other hand (see,for example, Avineri & Shalit, 1992, Daly 1993, Oldfield, 1990, Peled,1992 & Roche, 1987)

For the Liberals, citizenship has been envisaged as a relationship between individuals and the state, constructed by a set of formal rights and obligations. For the Republicans, citizenship is mediated by the ‘moral community’. While Liberals assume the priority of ‘right over good’ (Sandel,1982), for the Republicans, citizenship means active involvement and participation in the ‘determination, practice and promotion of the common good’. Thus, for Liberals, citizenship is foremost a status of an individual in relation to the state who does not have to be in any predetermined relationship with the other citizens [and thus, in a way continuing the citizenship tradition of the Roman Empire]. For Republicans, citizenship is foremost an act of active participation in the political community [and thus, in a way, continuing the citizenship tradition of the Greek Polis and Medieval Cities (Shafir, 1998)]. Communitarians go further than the Republicans. For them it is not just a question of people living with each other not as strangers but as part of a community. Rather, they perceive people as products of the community in which they were socialized and constructed since the day they were born.
Several issues are important in this debate to the question of racism and resistance to it. One issue is whether or not the citizen is an abstract individual or a gendered member of a particular community, with particular culture and tradition. It is not only Liberals but also Marx [in his article on the Jewish question, 1975] who constructed citizens as abstract individuals and saw all particularisms as belonging to the arena of the civil society rather than the political one. Such a universalist position can be seen as promising equal treatment and non discrimination towards individuals, but as Balibar (1990) and others have pointed out, it does not take into account the fact that, given the different positioning of individuals, such a formal universalism would necessarily be exclusionary. This has been particularly problematic for women, who remained invisible in this discourse for a long time, as a result, as Carole Pateman argued (1988) of being excluded from the public domain and the construction of the male [white] western citizen of the nation-state as a representative of his wife and children [a group of non citizens].

The question arises to what extent the republican and communitarian models, which do recognize people as members of specific communities, offer a better alternative that would be sensitive to issues of racism. Unfortunately, as I have elaborated elsewhere (Yuval-Davis 1997a ch.4, 1997b), the communities to which the promoters of these models relate, are usually perceived as ‘natural’ entities, with naturalized boundaries and naturalized sexual and generational divisions of labour. Moreover, those considered are usually hegemonic historical national communities. Peled (1992), when discussing the republican community, distinguished between two distinct notions of community that can be discerned in the current revival of republicanism: a weak community, in which membership is essentially voluntary, and a strong, historical community that is discovered, not formed by its members. In a strong community its ‘ongoing existence is an important value in and of itself’ and becomes one of the, if not the most, important imperatives of the ‘moral community’.

Membership in such a community involves ‘enduring attachment’, a myth of common destiny and often a myth of common origin, and is clearly bonded by a myth of common destiny. In other words, this ‘strong community’ is the national ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983). There is no difference between republican constructions of the ‘moral community’ and the \textit{gemeinschaft}-like constructions of the ‘national community’.

The question arises, then, what should happen to those members of the civil society who cannot or would not become full members of that ‘strong community’. As mentioned above, virtually in all contemporary states there are migrants and refugees, ‘old’ and ‘new’ minorities and in settler societies also indigenous people who are not part of the hegemonic national community (Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis, 1995). In addition, there are many other members of the civil society who, although they might share the myth of common origin of ‘the community’ do not share important hegemonic value systems with the majority of the population in sexual, religious and other matters (Evans,1993).

Works like those of Ignatief (1993), Kristeva (1993) and Habermas (1992) [see also Robert Fine’s critique of their works on nationalism, 1994], smooth over the difference between the members of national communities who share in the hegemonic majority’s ‘myth of common
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origin’ and those who do not. ‘Ethnic nationalism’ is perceived by them as a negative characteristic of ‘Others’. That things are experienced differently by the marginal Others in their ‘nations without nationalism’ [to use Kristeva’s book name] is not taken, or not taken enough, into account.

Residents, or even formal citizens of the state, who are not part of these communities, are excluded, at least partially, from full citizenship. In some cases the option of assimilation may be open for them, or at least for their children, and they become full citizens once the signifiers of difference between them and members of the citizenship community disappear. (This is how J.P. Sartre described liberal antisemitism, which is ready to accept the Jews, once there is nothing anymore which specifies them as Jews (1948)). At most, as Peled suggest (1992), those who are not members of the hegemonic ‘moral’ [or, rather, national] community’, may be offered liberal-like citizenship which gives them rights and responsibilities as individuals, rather than as members of the citizenship community.

Peled’s suggestion is similar to those of Taylor (1994) and Walzer (1994) who have attempted to solve this problematic within the liberal discourse, differentiating between what they call ‘liberalism 1’ and ‘liberalism 2’. Liberalism 1 is committed to individual rights and, following it, calls for the absolute neutrality of the state. Liberalism 2, on the other hand, allows the state to promote the existence and flourishing of a particular culture, as long as the rights of all citizens would be defended (Walzer, 1994:99). Walzer argues that ‘liberalism 2’ actually fits more closely the European model of the ‘nation state’ than that of liberalism 1 and does not seem to be perturbed by the necessarily exclusionary effects such a ‘liberalism’ might entail. Moreover, both Tamir (1998) and Burke (1999), in their different ways, point out that in reality there has not been such a difference between the two kinds of liberalism. In a way they both go back to Balibar’s argument that any ideology, such as liberalism, that presents itself as universalist and neutral, is exclusionary without acknowledging this.

T.H. Marshall (1950,1975,1981) who has been the most influential social scientist theoretician of citizenship and the welfare state, and who defines citizenship as ‘a full membership in the community’, assumes, like other theoreticians of citizenship, the overlapping relationship between the boundaries of the civil and political communities and the nation. However, unlike others, Liberals, Republicans or Communitarians, Marshall relates also to class differences among the members of the community. His approach to citizenship has two major advantages over the previous ones, which have been teased out and developed further by other citizenship scholars. One is that Marshall does not define citizenship explicitly in terms of the nation state at all. This allows a theorization of citizenship that views citizenship in the nation-state only as an historical phase in the history of citizenship which has existed in a variety of frameworks and polities - in cities [the Greek Polis and Medieval cities] and empires as well as in nation-states. With the evolving of the European Union, the UN and other inter- and supra-national polities, ‘post-Fordist citizenship’, to use Bryan Turner’s expression (1999), is progressively relevant to other bodies than that of the ‘nation-state’. As mentioned above, these different forms of citizenship
should not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather, contemporary citizenship should be seen as a multi-layered construct. I shall come back to that point later in the article.

Secondly, Marshall has brought into the arena of citizenship the notion of difference among citizens, when he discussed citizenship social rights. The development of the welfare rights was directly linked with differences in social needs. Marshall’s notion of citizenship is constructed, to use Edwards’ words (1988:135), as ‘treatment as equals rather than equal treatment’. Again, differences of ethnicity, nationality, race and culture are not mentioned in his work. Nor does his evolutionary paradigm of citizenship’s rights fit the way women’s citizenship’s rights have developed even in the UK, his historical model (Walby, 1994). However, his sensitivity to some differences among the members of the citizenship body, opened the way to do so for those who wanted to argue, especially within multi-cultural policy model, for the inclusion of these differences into the citizenship paradigm.

Social Rights and Social Difference

As originally envisaged by Beveridge (1942), social welfare rights were aimed at improving the quality of life of the working classes (as well as the smooth working of capitalism). As Harris (1987) put it, welfare was conceived as the institutionalized recognition of social solidarity within the political community of the citizens.

As Evans (1993) points out, this social solidarity is being threatened by a variety of groupings, ethnic, racial, religious and sexual sub-collectivities which exist within the marginal matrix of society and 'which experience informal and formal discrimination consonant with their credited lower social worth' (Evans, 1993:6). A primary concern of many relevant struggles and debates (Gordon, 1989; Hall & Held, 1989) has been around the right to enter or to remain in a specific country. The 'freedom of movement within the European community', the Israeli Law of Return and the Patriality clause in British immigration legislation - are all instances of ideological, often racist and sexist, constructions of boundaries which allow unrestricted immigration to some and block it completely to others.

Even when questions of entry and settlement have been resolved, the concerns of ethnic minorities might be different from those of other members of the society. For example, their right to formal citizenship might depend upon the rules and regulations of their country of origin in addition to those of the country where they live, as well as the relationship between the two. Thus, people from some Caribbean Islands who have been settled in Britain for years were told that they could not have a British passport because their country does not recognize dual citizenship and because they had not declare on time their intent to renounce the citizenship of their country of origin after it received independence. Concern over relatives and fear of not being allowed to visit their country of origin prevent others (such as Iranians and Turks) from giving up their original formal citizenship. Women workers who have children in other countries are often not entitled to receive child benefits like other mothers. Countries like Israel and Britain confer citizenship on those whose parents are citizens rather
than on those born in the country. Further, the right of entry to a country is often conditioned on a commitment by the immigrant that neither s/he or any other member of their family will claim any welfare benefits. This often results with extra caring burdens falling on the shoulders of the women of these families, as well as extra financial burdens to all.

However, as Shafir (1998:14) reminds us, one needs to differentiate between social rights that are universal, and welfare rights which are given only to those who need them. As Ruth Lister (1998:50) comments, the question of social heritage raises the question of ‘culture and tradition’. What is the extent to which people who belong to ethnic and national collectivities with different cultural ‘heritage’ to that of the hegemonic majority, would be entitled to receive support from the state in relation to theirs. This question is under intense debate between the ‘universalist’ Right who call for ‘the separation of race and the state’ (D’Souza, 1995) and the multiculturalists who call for the state to support each cultural group according to their needs.

Therefore, the growing importance of multicultural policies in many of the Western states towards settled minorities, as well as the rise of identity politics, has raised the question of the extent to which differences other than class, age and health should be acknowledged among citizens. A lot of the discussion on this has been related to the social rights of citizenship, both individual and collective.

For instance, an important debate has taken place on how would the state determine whether, what and how much resources it should distribute to each cultural minority. For some, (like Harris, 1987 and Lister, 1990) the problem remained within the realm of individual, though different, citizens. This is in contrast to multiculturalist policies that construct the population, or rather, effectively, the poor and working classes within the population, in terms of ethnic and racial collectivities. These collectivities are attributed with specific needs, based on their different cultures as well as on their structural disadvantages in the market place (see Burney, 1988; Cain & Yuval-Davis, 1990).

**Defining ‘Cultural needs’**

Jayasuriya’s answer (1991) to the question of how to define these specific needs, following Edwards (1988), has been to differentiate between ‘needs’ – which the state would provide and ‘wants’ which should be provided in the civil and private spheres. This answer is, of course, unsatisfactory, as the difference between ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ is context-dependent and subjective at best. There is also no prima-facie way to determine which groups would be defined as groups that are entitled to receive resources from the state and which groups would be considered too small or insignificant to receive them. The British census, for instance, mentions less than ten categories of ‘ethnic minorities’. The number of countries and language groups from which ethnic minorities’ people emigrated to the UK is much larger, and health and welfare services, for example, offer translators only to a small percentage of them. Political, economic and social power relations – both in the wider societies and within
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The minorities’ populations – determine the construction of minority collectivities and their boundaries within each polity.

The difficulty lies, then, in the processes involved in the construction of the minority collectivities and their boundaries in public and official discourse in any given moment. It also lies in the determination of what elements of these collectivities’ perceived ‘cultures’ belong to the public or to the private domain. The conceptualization of ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ as objective differences between essential and non essential cultural demands of specific sub collectivities within the civil society is, assumes a fixed a-historical essentialist model of what such culture are. However, cultures are highly heterogeneous resources which are used selectively, and often in contradictory ways, in different ethnic projects which are promoted by members of specific collectivities, often in a way which disadvantages women. This has often not been taken into account by multiculturalist state agents. (Sahgal & Yuval-Davis, 1992).

A different mode of supplying ‘cultural needs’ developed largely within the realm of the market oriented civil society that developed in Thatcherite Britain. The Thatcherite notion of citizenship as consumerism (Evans, 1993:6) was not based, of course, on a completely free market model, in spite of its universalistic rhetoric. There are legal and moral constraints that have prevented a variety of marginal or minority groups from pursuing their religious and cultural beliefs or economic needs in equal measure. The state’s management of these ‘moral aliens’ of various kinds who are to be found in the marginal matrix of citizenship, is exercised in social, political and economic arenas. This is the twilight zone between the liberal and republican constructions of citizenship, where religious, ethnic and sexual minorities are located outside the national ‘moral community’ but inside the civic nation. To those who can afford it, this is not a completely closed off system. Evans describes how sexual minority groups have developed socio-economic ‘community’ infrastructures around their identities, organized to obtain further housing, insurance, medical, parenting, marital rights etc and spend significant proportion of their income on distinguishable life styles in segregated or specifically gay social and sexual territories (1993:8). Multi-culturalism, aimed at ethnic minorities, can be described in similar terms (Stuart Hall, in a recent presentation in the Bristol Conference on Nationalities, Identities minorities summer 1999), described multiculturalism as ‘an epistemological irritant’). Multi-culturalist policies are aimed at simultaneously including and excluding the minorities, locating them in marginal spaces and secondary markets, while reifying their boundaries. The growth of lucrative ‘hybrid’ leisure and entertainment industries can be seen as a successful manipulation of upwardly mobile entrepreneurial, mostly second generation, minority members of such market openings.

Multi-culturalist ideologies, including its ‘hybrid’ forms, celebrating ‘travelling cultures’ and ‘cultural diversity’, however, have their limits [defined in this way in the clause on ‘the limits of multiculturalism’ in the Australian government document (Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989)]. Not all perceived ‘needs’ of ethnic minorities would be acceptable to the hegemonic majority. There are always cultural practices [from taking drugs to genital mutilation] that would not be accepted as legal practices in states where the hegemonic
majority’s moral code would reject these practices. Moreover, multi-cultural ideologies assume that beyond these ‘extremes’, the different cultures are compatible and that there is a prima-facie good will and interest in co-existence in a pluralist society – under the hegemony of the dominant collectivity, of course.

The 1989 ‘Rushdie Affair’, has been, in a way, a signal that things are not always that simple. It is not a question of conflicting cultures- as mentioned above, it has more to do with specific ethnic projects that use selectively specific cultural resources for particular political purposes. Rather, it is that while many celebrate the richness of multi-cultural societies, hybrid ‘travelling cultures’ and the ability to challenge authoritarian cultural and political traditions (Clifford, 1992; Gilroy, 1997), others look for ways to defend themselves from what they foresee as complete social disintegration and loss of cultural heritage and political autonomy (Stolcke, 1995). Majorities fear being ‘swamped’ by racial and ethnic minorities and minorities fear assimilation and collective disappearance. In the context of the growing rate of mixed marriages among western Jews the term ‘demographic holocaust’ has been known to be mentioned (Yuval-Davis, 1987). At the same time racism, immigration legislation and what the Canadian government calls ‘visibility’ of minorities can often trap people in enforced identities from which assimilation, as a strategy of self defence, is not possible. If citizenship is defined as full membership in the community, the lived experience of such people often would be dominated by encountering the varying ways and measures by which they are excluded from such membership (eg Wrench & Solomos, 1993).

‘Thin’ and ‘thick’ multiculturalism

Yael Tamir (1998), following Walzer (1994) differentiated between what she called thin and thick multiculturalisms. The first applies when the different cultures involved share liberal values and the second includes also non-liberal cultures. Tamir argues that political/cultural neutralism of the state is an ideal that is inapplicable in reality, even if the cultural particularity is often invisible to members of the hegemonic majority who tend to naturalize it as ‘human nature’. But there is no such a thing as just being ‘human’ – every social order is culturally constructed. Often, the choice, if at all, which is open to members of minority groupings is whether to keep their cultural identity but remain on the margins of society where they develop ways to accommodate into the local situation. The other alternative open to some of them, as part of upward social mobility, is to become culturally assimilated into the hegemonic majority. The recent celebration of hybrid and diasporic cultures (Bhabha,1994; Gilroy,1997) is a sign of a certain success of minority intellectuals and artists to resist such dichotomous choices, as well as constitute part of the effects of globalization. However, there is a need to differentiate between such voluntaristic hybridity and that of the working class and poor minority members, who have had to adopt to customs and institutions of the hegemonic societies as part of their strategies of survival (Werbner, 1999). Moreover, in these days of ‘culturalization’ (Allund,1995; Schierup,1995; Yuval-
Davis, 1997, ch. 3, it is important to remember that in addition to the cultural dimensions of the processes of racialization, there are also political and economic dimensions, although at the same time one should not collapse questions of exclusion and discrimination into those of disadvantage (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992).

Iris Marion Young (1995) has tried to solve the contradiction between ‘universalist’ democracy and the reality of life of oppressed and disadvantaged groupings in the society by transforming differences into political resources and bases of political representation in what she calls ‘communicative democracy’. Kymlica (1995), more sensitive than Young to power relations within, and not just between communities and groupings, presented a two-layered structure of rights – of the cultural community from the state and of individuals from the cultural community. Unlike Walzer and Tamir, Kymlicka can include this as a consistent part of his liberal model because for him the right for cultural affiliation is, in practice, an extension of the right for personal liberty (Margalit & Halbertal, 1998:100).

In spite of this important reservation, Kymlicka, like most of the other participants in this debate, tends to naturalize and homogenize the minority collectivities and even more so to reify and homogenize minority ‘cultures’. Probably this is so because the cultural artefact that most of the participants in this debate relate to, especially those who wrote about Quebec, has been that of language. Both the right to use one’s mother-tongue and the mother-tongue itself seem to be unproblematic. And yet we know that even in relation to languages cultural ‘stuff’ is far from being fixed and uncontested and subject to selective use reflecting particular specific ethnic and national political projects. Firstly, very often it is a highly political decision whether a certain dialect is considered an autonomous language or not. Secondly, very often, nationalist movements, like in Ireland and Wales reintroduce the ‘mother-tongue’ as part of their educational projects to children whose mothers actually do not speak these languages. The most extreme case has been the use of Hebrew in the Zionist movement. It is a known tale that the son of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, who wrote the first modern Hebrew dictionary, was kept away from any other children for the first four to five years of his life. Only then could his parents be sure that he had Hebrew as his mother tongue – at that time – the only child in the world to have it so. Other Jewish children at that time tended to have Yiddish, Ladino, or local languages as their mother tongues.

If ‘language as culture’ cannot be reified, once we look closer at the ways it has been used as a resource in a variety of political ethnic and national projects, other cultural resources, from religion to fashion, cannot either. Part of the problematics of multiculturalist policy makers with traditional and fundamentalist ‘ethnic leaders’ has been their acceptance of the version of culture presented by these leaders as the ‘authentic culture’. This is one of the problems that have not been solved, for instance, by the writers of the Macpherson Report. They recommend that the police and other governmental agents would become ‘sensitive to issues of cultural diversity’ without referring to what they mean by this and who would have the authority to define the meaning (1999). However, as mentioned above, this can often have very detrimental effects, on all marginal elements within ‘the community’ and on women in particular.
'Different' cultural traditions are often defined in terms of culturally-specific gender relations and the control of women's behaviour (in which women themselves, especially older women, also participate and collude) is often used to reproduce ethnic boundaries (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989). There have been many cases where social services and judges accepted such detrimental definitions of cultures which were both sexist and racist. One example is the case in which the judge refused a request for asylum to an Iranian woman who had to escape Iran after refusing to be veiled because 'this is their culture' [case recounted by the solicitor Jacqui Bhabha]. Another example is that of a young Muslim girl. She fled her parents home because of their restrictive control of her, and who was placed by the social services in another Muslim home, even more pious, against the wish of the girl and the advocacy of the Asian Women's Refuge (case recounted by the workers of Southall Black Sisters).

A contradictory, but not less racist multi-cultural practice is described by Jeanny Martin (1991), in which the practices of 'ethnic families' is weighed against a 'good society' model which becomes identical with some unspecified Anglo family norm. 'On behalf of ethnic women', there is a focusing on 'atavistic practices such as clitoridectomy, child marriages etc, as the 'limits of multi-cultural diversity'. Martin describes this approach as typical of the 'ethnicists' among the multi-culturalist theorists in Australia. She points out that what motivate them is not a real concern for women - because the ethnicists assume women's subordination to be part of the natural order of things in which the family is at the forefront. Rather, this is a device for ranking among the men, according to the extent of their deviation from the Anglo model - constructed in this discourse as the ideal positive model.

Therefore, as Gita Sahgal & I commented elsewhere (1992), some multi-culturalist notions of difference create a space for fundamentalist leaderships to rise and gain legitimacy as 'representing' the community. This is a result of the tendency of multiculturalist policies to often homogenize minorities and to attribute to all their members the same relationship to their 'culture and tradition' (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992).

This clearly has to be rejected. At the same time, as Balibar (1990), Iris Marion Young (1989) and Kymlicka (1995) have shown, among others, the classical liberal – and Marxist (1975)– notions of citizenship that adopts an individualist ‘universalist’ approach in which differences among citizens are seen as irrelevant, becomes, as a result, exclusionary and discriminatory. People’s membership in a state, their rights and responsibilities, are mediated by their membership in other collectivities and polities, sub-, cross- and supra-state. Hence, their positioning in that respect, as well as in terms of their class, gender, sexuality, stage in the life cycle, ability etc, have to be acknowledged in any citizenship project that in principle, at least, would be inclusionary and democratic. The Marshallian social welfare state catered for some class differences, but other modes of differences have been largely ignored (for a more elaboration of this point see Yuval-Davis 1997a:ch.4 or 1997b).
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Encompassing Equality by Difference – anti-racism and transversal citizenship

In our introduction to the book *Women, Citizenship and Difference* (Yuval-Davis & Werbner 1999), Pnina Werbner ‘imported’ an anthropological theory by Dumont (1972) on ‘encompassment. This theory points out that often (in the case of Dumont he was discussing the Indian caste system), contradictory value systems, do not exclude each other socially, but rather encompass each other. Essentialist notions of difference, promoted by ethnic and religious fundamentalist movements, are very different from the notions of difference promoted by those of us who believe in the importance of incorporating notions of difference into democracy. In the first case notions of difference replace notions of equality – in the second case they encompass it.

Notions of difference that encompass notions of equality, are not hierarchical and assume a-priori respect to others’ positionings – which includes acknowledgement of their differential social, economic and political power. This is the basis for dialogical transversal citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1994; 1997 a&b), the ‘grammar for democratic conduct (Mouffe, 1992:238). As the Italians feminists in Bologna taught us, such a grammar has to include ‘rooting’ and ‘shifting’ (Yuval-Davis, 1994) – acknowledgement of one’s own positioning(s) while empathising with the ways others’ positionings construct their gaze at the world.

In transversal citizenship politics, therefore, difference encompass equality and perceived unity and homogeneity are replaced by dialogues that give recognition to the specific positionings of those who participate in them as well as the ‘unfinished knowledge’ (Hill Collins, 1990:236) that each such positioning can offer. Crucial to such an epistemological and political approach is the differentiation between identification and participation as well as between identity and positioning. Group identities – ethnic, national, racial – tend to repress or marginalize differences among the members of the groupings – whether identified as ‘us’ or ‘them’. However, the nature of participation – of the membership – of the citizenship of people in these groupings is thoroughly affected by their positionings – social, economic, political and legal.

Much of the impetus of the development of the identity politics social movements, including the feminist movement, has been driven by such a recognition on a national scale. The recognition that nation-state citizenships are gendered, racialized, heterosexualized, as well as class differentiated – as has been recognized in the previous generation. However, such differences exist – and affect the mode of participation of people also in other intersecting layers of collectivities in which people operate. And as mentioned above, what affect people’s citizenships in the nation state is affected not only by their individual positionings but also the positionings of the other collectivities in which they are members, whether these are other nation-states, local communities, cross- ad supra-states. Religious codes can affect the lives of women just as much – and often more – than state legislation, and soliciting the support of an international agency can sometimes be the recourse of women who are disempowered within their local communities. This is one of the reasons why to continue and relate to citizenships only in terms of the nation-state and not membership in
other collectivities/polities, make incomprehensible the dynamics of contemporary nation-states citizenships themselves.

Transversal dialogue, therefore, is crucial for common political action. Transversal politics, nevertheless, does not assume that the dialogue is boundary free, and that each conflict of interest is reconcilable – although, as Jindi Pettman points out ‘there are almost always possibilities for cognial or at least tolerable personal, social and political engagements’ (1992:157). The boundaries of a transversal dialogue are determined, however, by the message, rather than the messengers. In other words, in addition to differentiating between identity and participation, transversal politics differentiate between social identities and social values (Assiter, 1996:ch.5). Assiter also argues that emancipatory values should be given priority in transversal politics as they are the ones that would ensure ‘an active commitment to listening to the voices of marginalized others...[which is] always underpinned by an evolving vision of emancipation (1999:50).

It is for these reasons that the discourse of citizenship, of multi-layered memberships in collectivities, with all the rights and responsibilities this involves, is of pivotal importance to the construction of any effective anti-racist anti-sexist strategy.

Some concluding ponderings

In her critique of the notion of diaspora, Floya Anthias challenged the reifying effect of this concept when dealing with issues of multiculturalism and anti-racism. Both as a descriptive typological tool, and as a social condition, argues Anthias, the concept of ‘diaspora’ ‘cannot attend fully to ‘intersectionality’, that is to issues of class, gender and trans-ethnic alliances (1998:557). Gilroy (1993) has used the notion as an alternative to the simplistic, unproblematic relationship between people, their community and their ‘homeland’. However, any formulation of anti-racist construction of citizenship, cannot deal with people only as part of collectivities that constitute only a part of the national collectivity. Avtar Brah (1996) has attempted to overcome this problematic by using the term of ‘diaspora space’ as means of decentering any privileged positioning of the hegemonic majority. Nevertheless, there is also the need for any anti-racist citizenship framework to recognize people’s affiliation with more than one collectivity and polity where they live and in other territories where their polities govern.

If people belong to more than one collectivity that can be in and outside the state in which they live, and if the boundaries of these collectivities are constantly shifting, the question arises by whom or how can their citizenships rights and responsibilities be determined. The answer to this question lies on our understanding of the interrelationships between citizenship rights and human rights.

Citizenship and human rights are often discussed as two separate arenas - the first one as associated with the national level and the second one with the international one (Pateman, 1996). However, I would argue that human rights discourse and legislation need to be viewed
as a specific layer of supra-national citizenship - the global one, which progressively affects more and more the national level and most importantly, individual citizens. This is done both by mobilizing politically around human rights discourse and by the growing use of human rights litigations in regional [eg the European Court of Human Rights] as well as international [eg the International War Crimes Tribunals] judiciaries by individuals, 'class acts' and international agencies (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1996). People’s membership in supra-state polities is therefore, like in states, partly direct and individual, and to a great extent mediated by their membership in other collectivities and states.

The establishment of the League of Nations after the First World War and even more so the United Nations after the Second World War, have launched an era of supra-state institutions and legislations. These institutions have acquired a growing amount of moral and legal authority over individual states and provided important arena for new, especially post-colonial states, to make their voices heard while not obliterating the political reality of the unequal power relations of international politics. The growing visibility and effectivity of the Non Governmental Organizations in recent United Nations conferences - on the environment in Rio, human rights in Vienna, population policies in Cairo and women in Beijing, have added the important element of the new social movements into international politics. Feminist activists who, for many years, have been part of autonomous movements started to find themselves listened to, and sometimes recruited by the UN, the World Bank, official aid organizations etc. This has presented opportunities as well as dangers of incorporation and co-optation to these activists. However, it is clear that even if sometimes the change is only cosmetic, there has been a change of style, and occasionally of substance in hegemonic discourses concerning a variety of important policy issues (eg the linkage of population policies with women’s reproductive rights and health) (Yuval-Davis & Vargas, 1999).

At the same time, however, as Yasmin Soysal (1994) has pointed out, there is a certain paradox in the growing importance of the supranational authority of human rights declarations and treaties. While they are aimed at controlling and guiding state agencies, the executors of these international codes of rights and the members of international bodies are still the states and no international agency has the right to 'interfere in the internal affairs' of their states. Nevertheless, given that most recent wars have taken place within states between different ethnic/national groupings and not between states, and that the UN or other suprastate forces such as NATO have gone to these countries as ‘peace keepers’, even that accepted rule seems to be crumbling. The viability of states as representing the only significant political frameworks of populations is crumbling with it (Held, 1995; Anderson, forthcoming). This, notwithstanding the ‘real politic’ interests of states that usually determine where how such interventions take place, and the very real violations of human rights that usually are involved in such ‘peace keeping’ military interventions. As Francesca Klug (1999) has pointed out, human rights legislations have to be seen not just as essentially formal legal documents [or, I would add, a set of governmental and supra-governmental policies and actions], but also as a set of values, a type of secular ethics that is growing in importance, even if contested.
It is important to remember, however, that it is not only the UN and its associated organizations, NATO or even regional organizations like the EU or, much weaker ones, like the Arab League, for instance, which constitute the only international forums which affect people's memberships in their communities and states. International religious organizations/projects like the Catholic Church or the Muslims Khalifa have important normative as well as political projects which affect people's affiliations and ways of life.

Similarly, sub- or cross-national collectivities, with their own internal norms and regulations, based on traditional and invented traditional (Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983) power relations, would determine individual rights and responsibilities in gendered, aged and other ascribed ways. (Yuval-Davis, 1997a, 1999)

At the beginning of the paper, I related to the paradigmatic shift that is taking place these days in academic and political circles in the thinking on racism and anti-racism and wondered what, if anything, the current debates on issues of citizenship could contribute to such a shift. Several such contributions have been raised in the paper, relating to issues such as individual and collective rights, social rights and social difference, transversal dialogue and the encompassment of equality and difference.

However, probably the most significant contribution lies in the recognition of the multi-layered nature of citizenship and the separation of issues of citizenship from the state.

Such a recognition entails the acceptance that processes of racialization operate not only on interpersonal or institutional levels but also on the level of collectivities and communities which often constitute powerful polities in themselves, autonomous if not often independent of the state. Such a recognition entails the acceptance that people and communities who are in the positionings of racialized minorities in one layer of their citizenship can be the ones who racialize ethnocized Others in another layer of their citizenship [as well as or alternatively exclude or subjugate others in other ways, such as gendered, aged and classed]. Probably above all, however, such a recognition entails the acceptance that people’s rights, including the right not to be racialized, are not negotiable.

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Racism and anti-Semitism have taken lives in France in recent years. They can be seen in the street, on the walls of places of worship, on social media and in online forums. For millions of French people, they translate into insults, intimidation, assault and discrimination. Pupils are forced to leave school because of their religion. Young people do not find work because their name sounds foreign. Parliament members are insulted because of the colour of their skin. These cowardly, grave and degrading attitudes hurt victims and their loved ones. They hurt France. For the government, fighting t ‘Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others’™: The Hierarchy of Citizenship in Austria. Laws, Vol. 8, Issue. 3, p. 14. I argue that marriage is used as a means of discrimination against minorities, and I question whether the proper solution to this violation of human rights is indeed to add more and more minorities to the privileged class of those who can marry, thus equipping them with the weapon of marriage to use against others. Request PDF | On May 30, 2006, GEOFFREY SHORT published Prejudice, Power and Racism: Some Reflections on the Anti-Racist Critique of Multi-Cultural Education | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate. This paper questions the efficacy of ‘empowerment™ in educational research by interrogating its casual use in a range of different, sometimes contrasting, research discourses. In particular it draws attention to the distinction between ‘empowerment™ and ‘giving a voice™, demonstrating that the former cannot be read off automatically from the latter. Reviews research regarding the effects of intergroup contact on ethnic relations. The investigations discussed include both intra- and cross-cultural studies involving contact between various ethnic groups.